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Latin America has long been a violence-prone continent. No other region of the world knows higher homicide rates nor has such a variety of violence. Political 
violence, guerilla movements and civil wars, bloody revolutions, brutal dictatorships, domestic violence, criminal violence, and youth violence are all well 
known throughout history. This article gives an overview of the historical development of violence in Latin America and the Caribbean, examining its specific-
ities and changes. The focus is on the recent explosion of violence and crime since the 1980s. As a literature review, it summarizes the main findings of aca-
demic research on violence in the different Latin American countries, thus providing additional insights into the major topics and research interests of Latin 
American and international institutions. After a short introduction and some remarks on the historical development of violence, the main part of the article 
deals with the recent rise of violence in the region. A special focus is on youth violence. At the end, the causes, costs, and consequences of violence for the 
Latin American societies are addressed.
Latin America has long been a violence-prone continent. 
No other region in the world shows higher homicide rates, 
no other region shows such a variety of different types and 
forms of violence. A high incidence of crime, the prolife-
ration of violent youth gangs, the prevalence of domestic 
violence, violence related to drug trafficking or money 
laundering as the burning issues of the day come on top of 
more historical forms of violence in the form of persistent 
civil wars, guerilla movements and death squads, state ter-
rorism and dictatorships, social uprisings and violent rev-
olutions (Bodemer, Kurtenbach, and Meschkat 2001; 
Briceño-León 2001, 2007; Cueva Perus 2006; Davis 2006; 
Fajnzylber, Lederman, and Loayza 2001; Fischer and Kren-
nerich 2000; Frühling and Tulchin 2003, 2005; Munck 
2008; PAHO 1996; Pécaut 1997; Petrissans Aguilar 2005; 
Romano 2005; Visión Mundial 2003; Rotker 2002; Salama 
2008; Stanley 2009).
The distressing thing about this violence is not just its my-
riad manifestations, but also its nature and extent. Violence 
is a persistent feature of Latin American history and in 
many places is now so widespread that it cannot be ig-
nored. Hence the need for some explanation of its specific 
causes and background and why certain types of violence 
are prevalent in particular regions or countries.
Although Latin Americans might be broadly accustomed to 
violence and crime, the particular configuration of violence 
that the different countries have experienced since the 
1980s has given rise to major concern among citizens and 
governments. According to World Bank data, the homicide 
rate in Latin America has increased by 50 percent since the 
1980s, and most of the victims of violence are young people 
between the ages of 15 and 25 (World Bank 2010a; Morri-
son 2007; Waiselfisz 2008). This development exacerbates 
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already high rates of homicide within the different coun-
tries. Data on homicides drawn from the WHO World Re-
port on Violence and Health (2002), for instance, indicate 
that Latin American youth is the group most targeted for 
violence in the world. About 29 percent of homicides in 
Latin America are of children and youth aged 10 to 19 and 
homicide is the second leading cause of death for this age 
group in ten of the twenty-one countries in the region with 
populations over one million. Youth homicide rates are up 
to three times higher than overall national homicide rates
Yet these figures are just the tip of the iceberg. Although 
murders are relatively easy to record, we should be aware 
that murder and manslaughter account for only a small 
part of the violence. If we imagined the distribution of vi-
olence within a society as a pyramid we would find the 
murder cases at the top; below them would be the violence 
officially recorded by the police and the security authorities 
and by health and social services organizations; below that 
the so-called “reported violence” from surveys, and finally 
at the bottom, the “non-reported” violence not recorded 
anywhere (the “dark figure”), which would occupy the 
most space. International organizations have calculated 
that the economic costs of violence for a society and for in-
dividuals are immense. Violence is a key obstacle to devel-
opment (Ayres 1998; Cohen 2005; Gaviria, Guerrero, and 
Londoño 2000; Londoño and Guerrero 1999; McIlwaine 
1999; Skaperdas et al. 2009; Solimano 2004; WHO 2004).
At the same time we should avoid over-generalizations. 
Despite these data and the current high rates of violence, we 
should be aware that the level of violence has varied con-
siderably over the course of history, the forms of violence 
have changed, and specific kinds of violence seem to have 
been dominant or become the subject of public debate in 
particular periods (Fandino Marino 2004; Timmons 2007).
For the purposes of this literature review, we consider viol-
ence primarily as direct physical violence exerted against in-
dividuals or groups by individual or collective perpetrators. 
Generally, we follow the WHO definition: “The intentional 
use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, against 
oneself, another person, or against a group or community 
that either results in or has a high likelihood of resulting in 
injury, death, psychological harm, mal-development, or de-
privation” (WHO 2002). Although this is without doubt the 
core of the general understanding of violence, it might be 
useful to consider some other forms of structural and cultu-
ral violence which are in many aspects interwoven with the 
different forms of physical violence and political order in 
Latin America (Imbusch 2003). Despite the vagueness of 
these concepts, neglecting structural or cultural violence on 
a continent with profound social inequalities and important 
class and race cleavages, with strong discrimination and so-
cial exclusion, with extreme wealth and extreme poverty, is 
to omit important aspects of violence in this region.
There is an obvious need to differentiate between the cat-
egories: social, economic, political, and institutional viol-
ence. Whereas social violence should be understood violent 
acts motivated by the desire, conscious or unconscious, for 
social gain or to obtain or maintain social power (for ex-
ample interpersonal violence, violence against spouses, 
child abuse, sexual assault of women and children, loss of 
control in arguments), economic violence is violent acts 
motivated by the desire, conscious or unconscious, for 
economic gain or to obtain or maintain economic power 
(for example street crime, carjacking, robbery and theft, 
drug trafficking, kidnapping, assaults in the course of econ-
omic crimes including killing and rape). Political and in-
stitutional violence involves violent acts motivated by the 
desire, conscious or unconscious, to obtain or maintain 
political power (for example civil war, guerilla or para-
military conflict, politically motivated assassinations, armed 
conflict between political parties, terrorism and state terror-
ism, violence perpetrated by state political institutions such 
as the army, the police, or other security forces).
The high incidence of violence in Latin America has above all 
to do with the great social inequality and the unequal life 
chances of Latin Americans, with the juxtaposition of extreme 
poverty and tremendous wealth, with sustained processes of 
social exclusion, with the fragile legitimacy of the state mon-
opoly on violence, with widespread deficits in the rule of law, 
and with extensive corruption among the police. Yet it also 
has to do with a machismo culture, indeed sometimes even 
with a genuine “culture of violence” (Buvinic, Morrison, and 
Orlando 2005). Violence as a form of behavior and a means of 
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engaging in conflict or asserting interests is hence far more ac-
cepted and far less an anathema than in, say, Western Europe.
Violence has been addressed as a complex phenomenon by 
many academic disciplines with their own perspectives on 
violence. Traditionally, violence in its most common forms 
has been regarded as an issue of criminal and social pathol-
ogy and criminologists treated it as a kind of deviant be-
havior. It violates the prevailing values and norms of a 
society and represents a threat to order and integration, 
and must therefore be punished as a criminal offense. 
Then, violence has been considered as a political and social 
phenomenon, pointing to the political mobilization rates 
and social background of the perpetrators or to the politi-
cal character of violent actions. Political scientists and soci-
ologists therefore emphasize behavioral rationalizations, 
the internal logic underlying violent acts, and the political 
context in which violence takes place. Their concern is to 
arrive at appropriate explanations for and understanding of 
violence by taking account of the biographies and social 
environment of the perpetrators. They also seek to find out 
under what social circumstances violence becomes an ef-
fective behavior or an end in itself. Psychologists and social 
psychologists are more interested in individual or collective 
predispositions toward violence. They investigate how indi-
viduals develop a willingness to engage in violence and how 
victims of violence address their traumatic experiences. 
Nowadays, because of the high social and economic costs 
associated with violence and crime, it is widely recognized 
as a public health or macro-economic problem. Public 
health specialists consider violence as a kind of social pan-
demic because of the ongoing social and health problems 
involved, economists care about the direct and indirect 
costs associated with the different forms of violence, thus 
pointing to the adverse effects for the socio-economic de-
velopment of societies affected by severe forms of violence.
Despite the fact that violence is a problematic worldwide 
phenomenon (WHO 2002), violence in Latin America and 
the Caribbean – due to its simple size – is becoming an ever 
more urgent challenge and a major economic, social, health 
and governance issue (Buvinic, Morrison, and Shifter 
1999). Crime and violence adversely affect economic and 
social development, strengthen social exclusion and pover-
ty, undermine citizenship and security, and reduce the ca-
pacity of the state to govern effectively.
This review surveys the recent literature on crime and viol-
ence in Latin America and the Caribbean and provides a 
broad overview of the main ideas, principal research topics, 
and empirical findings, addressing the historical background 
of violence in Latin America (section 1), the different areas of 
violence research since the 1980s (section 2), and the specific-
ities of youth violence (section 3). The concluding section (4) 
summarizes the main findings and suggests lines of further 
research and policy recommendations. An appendix provides 
important links to useful internet sites and data sources.
1. Historical Background
It would be easy to write the history of Latin America as a his-
tory of violence (Bodemer, Kurtenbach, and Meschkat 2001; 
Davis 2006; Fischer and Krennerich 2000; Kruijt and Torres-
Rivas 1991; Lewis 2005; Visión Mundial 2003; Waldmann and 
Reinares 1999). Although this seems to be an inadequate gen-
eralization because periods of peace, civilizing processes, and 
democratization are neglected, it is easy to see that violence 
never has been absent in Latin American societies (Drake 
2009; Halperin Donghi 1993; Safford and Palacios 2001; Sier-
ra 2005; Touraine 1988; Waldmann 1994; Wickham-Crowley 
1991). Although violence is historically endemic in the region, 
we will have to confine ourselves here to a brief outline of the 
history of violence there (for more detail, see Bernecker 
1992ff.; Bethell 1984ff.; Rehrmann 2005; Tenenbaum 1996).
A history of violence in Latin America has not to start with 
the Spanish and Portuguese conquerors in the late-
fifteenth century but with the pre-Colombian cultures and 
their violent orders and bloody rituals. The cultures of the 
Mayas, Incas, and Aztecs were great empires with violent 
orders. The function of violence was primarily mythical 
(e.g. human sacrifice, funerary cults). Violence was used in 
the conquest of foreign empires and to secure power. The 
less highly developed cultures of the Caribs, Arawaks, and 
Mapuche, too, were warlike peoples to a significant degree 
(König, Riekenberg, and Rinke 2005).
The discovery and conquest of South America by the Span-
ish and the Portuguese in the late-fifteenth century, along 
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with the gradual colonization of the subcontinent that fol-
lowed, opened up a new chapter in the history of violence 
(Bitterli 1980; McAlister 1984; Reinhard 1985; Schmitt 
1984). Although there were some regional variations, the 
swift decline of the last pre-Colombian cultures, the violent 
conquest of their individual empires by approximately 
1550, the expulsion, extermination, and enslavement of the 
native inhabitants, and the creation of (colonial) govern-
ments based on forced labor characterized the course of al-
most the next three hundred years (Konnetzke 1965; 
Lockhart and Schwartz 1983). The significance and con-
sequences of colonialism in Latin America remain con-
troversial to this day, and there are ongoing debates about 
the symbolic and cultural implications of slavery and 
about whether the colonial era was crucial in setting the 
course for the future development of the continent.
The early independence of Latin America in the opening 
decades of the nineteenth century – with Haiti leading the 
field in 1804 (Ambroise and Rameau 1990; Fick 1990) – 
resulted in the conflictive founding of states and nations 
in all regions of the continent (Centeno 1997, 2002; 
López-Alves 2000; Thies 2005; Dunkerley 2002). But state- 
and nation-building remained incomplete, leading to on-
going weakness and limited state capacities to integrate 
fragmented societies. The crisis of the Latin America’s 
state became as notorious as the deficits in national iden-
tity (Kurtz 2009; Miller 2006). The birth of these states 
was followed by violent alternations between centralists 
and federalists about the forms the new republics were to 
take, and the national borders of some countries shifted 
several times as the result of violent conflicts (Rinke 
2010). Only gradually did governmental structures acquire 
stability, and only slowly were the young republics con-
solidated through the hegemony of local caudillos (Lynch 
1992). The independence movements frequently resulted 
in the establishment of authoritarian governments and 
dictatorships (as in Central America and the Andean re-
gion) in which specific aspects of the colonial heritage 
were preserved. The consolidation of Argentina and Chile 
as nation-states did not come about until the mid-
nineteenth century, when the interior was occupied and 
the “frontera” to the south was overcome by force (Esp-
arza, Huttenbach, and Feierstein 2009; Rock 1987). In the 
Caribbean, colonial dependencies remained largely intact. 
Only Brazil, which was governed by an emperor, suc-
ceeded in swiftly achieving stability (Smith 2002). Most of 
the debates about this phase in the continent’s devel-
opment center around the significance of the wars of inde-
pendence for the constitutions and the self-image of the 
young nations. They also focus on the nature of the revol-
utions that led to independence and on their consequences 
for the region’s continued socio-economic development, 
especially considering the vastly different developmental 
paths taken by South and North America (Fowler and 
Lambert 2006; Knöbl 2007).
During the second half of the nineteenth century, almost all 
the subcontinent’s nations benefited from the liberal phase 
of world trade initiated under the leadership of Great Bri-
tain. This led to the formation of liberal oligarchies that 
were able to use the export economy (trade in natural re-
sources, agricultural products, minerals) to consolidate their 
power and wealth and permanently stabilize their states. 
Only in the Southern Cone and later in Brazil were these de-
velopments accompanied by a limited degree of democra-
tization. Authoritarian regimes or outright developmental 
dictatorships were dominant everywhere else, such as the 
Andean region and Central America. The Porfiriate in 
Mexico (1880–1910) was the textbook example of such a 
dictatorship of modernization, decreed and implemented 
from above. However, it culminated directly in the Mexican 
Revolution of 1910–1917 (Tobler 1984; Guerra 1985; Knight 
1986), where more than one million people died.
The last of the wars between individual Latin American 
states over disputed territory were waged around the turn 
of the twentieth century. More important than these 
border disputes, however, was the Cuban war of indepen-
dence. As a result of the meteoric rise of the United States 
to the status of a world power, this conflict grew into a 
Spanish-American war, in the aftermath of which Cuba at-
tained formal independence in 1898 (Benjamin 1990; 
Pérez-Stable 1993). The rise of the United States and its 
ambitions for hegemony in its own “back yard” resulted 
not only in the irrevocable loss of influence of the former 
colonial powers of Spain and Portugal, but also to a real-
ignment of the political and economic balance of power in 
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the region (the Monroe Doctrine), which led to a number 
of U.S. interventions in various countries on the sub-
continent (Dent 1999; Niess 1984; Schoultz 1998).
The sociological and historical discussions about the liberal 
oligarchic phase of Latin American development centered 
mainly around the status of political violence in the mod-
ernizing dictatorships and, of course, around revolutionary 
violence of the kind that occurred during the Mexican Rev-
olution. Violence as such, however, was not the main focus 
of interest; rather, violence was interpreted as a byproduct 
of political events.
The liberal oligarchic developmental phase ended, at the latest, 
with the world economic crisis of 1929. Efforts to achieve 
economic autarky during World War I, the subsequent col-
lapse of the export model during the Great Depression, and 
the closure of important trade routes during World War II 
forced the states to reorient their economic development stra-
tegy towards import substitution industrialization (ISI). The 
state now came to view itself as the central motor of devel-
opment whose duty was to provide flanking measures and 
economic policy support for the reorientation (Cardoso and 
Faletto 1976). In Mexico, what emerged from the turmoil of 
the revolution was a (semi-authoritarian) political regime that 
aimed at the inclusion and integration of all parts of the 
population within a corporatist state and its political party, the 
Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI). Over the coming 
decades (until 1982), this regime ensured an unprecedented 
period of political stability, economic growth, and social 
equalization that became known as the “milagro mexicano” 
(Cockcroft 1983; Moreno-Brid and Ros 2009). In Brazil, Getu-
lio Vargas and his successors pursued an ambitious indus-
trialization and development project that, however, soon ran 
into difficulties after which the military staged a coup d’état in 
1964. In contrast, developments in the Southern Cone were 
characterized by a far-reaching process of democratization 
and expansion of opportunities for social participation. In Ar-
gentina, the Peron regime (1943–55) triggered the necessary 
upheaval (Waldmann 1974). After Peron was ousted in 1955, a 
long period of political instability ensued in which civilian and 
military governments alternated in rapid succession (Rouquié 
1986). Under the second Peronist regime, Peron’s brief return 
to power in the early 1970s, the country moved towards con-
ditions resembling civil war (Lewis 2001; Marchak 2000). In 
contrast, Chile and Uruguay went through an exemplary pro-
cess of democratization from the 1930s onwards and have 
been ruled by an unbroken succession of democratic govern-
ments since that date. The extension of political participation, 
the social integration of hitherto disadvantaged or excluded 
sectors of the population, and economic growth initially 
meant that these countries experienced very little social viol-
ence and even less political violence. It was not until the ISI-
induced economic development process in Chile reached its 
limits during the 1960s and the course of political reform and 
social equalization began to stall while political participation 
increased, that a process of radicalization set in which brought 
the socialist Allende government to power in 1970, and a mili-
tary dictatorship shortly afterwards in 1973 (Imbusch 1995). 
In Uruguay, the political exhaustion of the two alternating 
parties in the early 1970s led to the formation of an urban 
guerrilla force (Arocena 1987; Rey Tristan 2006) and then to a 
creeping transition into a military dictatorship.
Developments in Central America, the Andean region, and 
some Caribbean states took a very different course. The oli-
garchic regimes continued to exist in Central America 
(Bulmer-Thomas 1987; Torres-Rivas 1993), where they de-
veloped into tenacious dictatorships against which the ear-
liest guerrilla and resistance movements were formed in the 
1930s. As the economic growth benefited only a few family 
clans and there were no processes of social equalization, 
opposition movements were brutally suppressed and all 
forms of resistance persecuted (Bulmer-Thomas 1995). 
After the assassination of the popular politician Gaitán in 
1948 (Braun 1986), Colombia lapsed into a bewilderingly 
complex civil war in which the state, parastatal violent ac-
tors, and guerrilla movements fought one another. After 
this phase, which became known as the “violencia”, the 
situation stabilized only briefly before new violent actors 
arose and ultimately swamped the country in an orgy of vi-
olence. Bolivia, Peru, and Ecuador were ruled by a rapid 
succession of military and civilian governments from the 
1930s onwards (Booth and Sorj 1983; Dunkerley 1984; 
Malloy and Gamarra 1988). These three countries were 
characterized by chronic socio-economic instability and a 
series of political revolutions (such as the Bolivian revol-
ution led by the MNR in 1952; the Peruvian military coup 
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from the political left in 1968). Venezuela alone, after many 
years of dictatorship and a brief phase of civil war, achieved 
with the “Pacto de Punto Fijo” (1958) a liberal democracy 
in which two parties alternated in power until the 1980s.
The larger Caribbean islands were mostly ruled by brutal dic-
tatorships from the 1930s onwards (Higman 2011). The 
Dominican Republic was under the absolute rule of the dic-
tator Trujillo from 1930 to 1961. After his assassination, his 
successor, the democratically elected President Bosch, was 
overthrown in an American invasion (Krohn-Hansen 2008; 
Wiarda 1989). In Haiti, the Duvalier clan had a firm hold on 
the country from the 1930s. The first ruler was “Papa Doc”, 
followed until 1986 by his son “Baby Doc”. The regime was 
backed up by the notorious “Tontons Macoutes”, a special po-
lice/thug group that kept the population in check and brutally 
suppressed any sign of resistance to the regime (Abbott 1991; 
Ferguson 1987). Cuba came under strong American influence 
by the early 1950s, when the dictator Batista rose to power 
and supported the interests of the United States (Zeuske and 
Zeuske 1998) until he was ousted from office in 1958 by the 
successful revolution of Fidel Castro (Zeuske 2000).
The 1970s and 1980s were a time of upheaval in Latin 
America. The strategies of economic development based 
on import substitution were gradually exhausting them-
selves everywhere, while the debt crisis of 1982 forced 
drastic austerity measures and budget cuts. “Neo-liberal” 
politics and monetarist economic policies became more 
and more widespread. The political landscape was domi-
nated by uprisings (in Central America) and military dicta-
torships (in the Southern Cone). Elsewhere, such as in the 
Andean region, chronic economic instability and suscepti-
bility to political crises intensified.
Central America saw from the early 1970s the rise of new 
guerrilla movements that openly questioned the traditional 
systems of government and violently opposed the oligarchies 
(Kruijt 2008; Vilas 1995; Torres-Rivas 1981; Wickham-
Crowley 1993). In Nicaragua, the fight against the Sandinista 
Liberation Front (FSLN) grew into a fully-fledged national 
uprising and culminated in 1979 in a victory over the Somo-
za dictatorship, which had been in power since 1937. In El 
Salvador, the bitter struggle of the Frente Farabundo Martí 
(FMLN) failed in the 1980s after the oligarchy was able to se-
cure political and military backing from the United States. In 
Guatemala, too, the guerrilla groups that formed the Unidad 
Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG) ultimately 
remained unsuccessful. The failure of the uprisings sub-
sequently led not to the pacification of these countries, but 
to a continuing escalation of violence perpetrated by a wide 
range of different protagonists. Costa Rica alone, thanks to a 
number of unique conditions in its history, remained an 
oasis of peace and nonviolence in the region.
The political landscape of the Southern Cone was domi-
nated by brutal military dictatorships (Remmer 1989) 
whose character has been analyzed in the literature in terms 
of the “bureaucratic-authoritarian state” where the govern-
mental bureaucracy was placed at the immediate service of 
violence under the rule of technocrats. These dictatorships 
pursued a long-term project for the transformation of so-
ciety. In terms of the economy, this involved a neo-liberal 
restructuring (liberalization, deregulation, reduction of 
state influence, and limitation of state power to core func-
tions) on the model of the “Chicago Boys”. In political 
terms, it sought to combat the subversion, communism, 
and terrorism that supposedly lurked in every corner and 
to foster the “true” values of the nation. In military terms, 
the regimes saw themselves embroiled in an internal war 
that they sought to win by means of a counter-insurgency 
concept imported from the United States (Gill 2004). They 
were willing to employ any means that seemed likely to 
help attain these ends, from systematic torture to state ter-
rorism (Huggins 1991; Tobler and Waldmann 1991).
The chaos of the later Allende years in Chile was ended by 
the military coup by Augusto Pinochet in 1973 (Constable 
and Valenzuela 1991). Despite repeated crises, his military 
regime proved to be long-lived and brought about funda-
mental changes in the country. Pinochet and his “Chicago 
Boys” restructured the economy according to liberal econ-
omic principles (García 1989), seriously weakened the 
forces on the left of the political spectrum, and delegitim-
ized socialist thought. Violence directed against the dicta-
torship was met with repression, torture, and murder 
(Valenzuela and Valenzuela 1986). Even the subsequent 
transition to democracy in 1990 took place under the aus-
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pices of the dictatorship and left the country deeply di-
vided (Moulian 1997). The new, post-dictatorial Chile is a 
fundamentally transformed country which bears no econ-
omic or political resemblance to the pre-dictatorship Chile 
of the Allende years (Angell and Pollack 1993). In Ar-
gentina, a military junta led by Jorge Videla put an end in 
1976 to the second Peronist regime that had become mired 
in violence and conditions resembling civil war, with urban 
guerrillas, parastatal violence, Triple A (Alianza Anticom-
unista Argentina), and more (Auyero 2007; Robben 2007). 
This attempt, euphemistically named “proceso”, to trans-
form the country cost the lives of over thirty thousand 
people and ended under General Galtieri with the military 
debacle of the Malvinas War (1982) and the total discredi-
ting of the military. Unlike the case of Chile, what the dic-
tatorship achieved here was a work of destruction large 
enough to generate political and economic instability and 
crises that would lead to severe polarization and social dis-
integration in the years that followed. In Uruguay, the tran-
sition to dictatorship came gradually in the years from 
1973 to 1975, after urban guerrillas had caused increasing 
levels of violence and insecurity in the country (Kroch 
1991). Although Uruguay is a small country, it was known 
until 1985 as South America’s “torture chamber”.
The military regime in Brazil (1964–85) occupies a special 
position in that it experienced more pronounced increases 
in violence and more frequent changes of leadership (Alves 
1985; Skidmore 1988; Stepan 1988, 2009). The dictatorships 
of Castelo Branco (1964–67), Costa e Silva (1967–69), 
Souza e Mello (1969), Médici (1969–74), Geisel (1974–79), 
and Figueiredo (1979–85) were rooted in the state adminis-
trative system and established a new generation of regime-
dependent technocrats and bureaucrats. Additionally, there 
was ideological continuity between the “tenentismo” of the 
1930s and the military dictatorship, in that the military saw 
itself the elite and the keeper of the peace. Nevertheless, the 
coup in 1964 caused an increase in institutionalized viol-
ence (“violencia institucional”) in Brazil. State terror and 
the persecution of oppositionists increased rapidly, al-
though they never reached the levels of the Southern Cone 
states. In the army, the traditional military virtues were 
blended with a belief in progress, with progressive concepts 
married to a messianic sense of mission. These ideals 
seemed impossible to achieve without ensuring “internal 
security” and eliminating political resistance and potential 
communist conspiracies. The military declared commu-
nism, which was regarded as a particularly dangerous threat 
after the victory of the Cuban revolution in 1959, the main 
enemy and blamed it for the “revolutionary, subversive 
war” against the country’s internal and external security.
The Andean region entered a phase of chronic crisis and 
political and economic instability in the mid-1970s. In Co-
lombia, the FARC and the ELP stepped up their guerrilla op-
erations against the government (Pécaut 2006a, 2006c; Braun 
2003). The Cali and Medellín drug cartels were the first to ex-
ercise “disciplinary violence” in addition to the typical ac-
tivities of organized crime syndicates. Later they also 
diversified into a kind of vigilante terrorism in the form of 
“social purges” against what were termed “desechables” – 
prostitutes, street children, thieves, homosexuals, homeless 
people, and urban and rural vagrants. Revenge and retali-
ation to avenge slights to the honor of the organization were 
also widespread. The formation of death squads and so-
called “self-defense units” escalated the violence of the battle 
against drugs and terrorism. The governments of Ecuador, 
Bolivia, and Peru changed in rapid succession in the 1980s. 
Administrative and economic policies were often erratic and 
contributed little towards improving the tense social situation 
in these countries (Kurtenbach, Minkner-Bünjer, and Stein-
hauf 2004). In Peru, the Maoist Shining Path guerrilla move-
ment (Sendero Luminoso) spread violence and terror in the 
Andean highlands and elsewhere (Degregori 1990; Palmer 
1992). It was not until the 1990s, after a significant escalation 
of the violence, that the authoritarian regime of Alberto Fuji-
mori was able to crush this movement. In Venezuela, the first 
cracks and fault lines in the liberal democratic order were pa-
pered over with the “new” wealth from the oil trade (after the 
oil price hikes in the 1970s) and the country gave itself over 
to the illusion of the “administration of abundance”.
In response to pressure from civil society, the phase of de-
mocratization (O’Donnell, Whitehead, and Schmitter 
1986) after the dictatorships frequently saw the formation 
of truth and reconciliation commissions to assess the viol-
ence of the past and systematically investigate human 
rights violations (Schmolze and Rauchfuss 2007). Despite 
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political restrictions and widespread amnesties, the reports 
of these commissions helped to reconstruct and document 
the worst of the violent crimes of the military dictator-
ships. The most famous include the Rettig Commission in 
Chile, the “Nunca Más” report in Argentina, the report by 
the Archdiocese of São Paulo in Brazil, the reports of the 
CVR in Peru and COVERDAD in Ecuador, and initial 
studies by the CNRR in Colombia. But resistance from the 
military and powerful interest groups connected to the 
military meant that criminal prosecutions were generally 
slow to begin (Kaleck 2010; Koonings and Kruijt 1999; 
Krumwiede and Waldmann 1998; Nunn 2004).
The 1970s and 1980s brought not only considerable politi-
cal and socio-economic change in the countries of Latin 
America (Munck 2008), but also significant change in the 
forms of the prevalent violence (Brysk 2003; Esparza, Breen 
Smith, and Gunning 2011). For several decades, political vi-
olence was a common feature of life in Latin America. Civil 
wars raging throughout Central America, and brutal mili-
tary dictatorships, guerilla warfare, and terrorism in the 
Southern Cone and the Andean countries all contributed to 
the formation of a “culture of violence”. While the over-
whelming majority of violence – whether committed from 
above by the state and parastatal entities or from below by 
guerrilla forces – has been political violence, this form of 
violence has now receded significantly in most of the coun-
tries on the continent and has been replaced by other 
forms, mainly social, but also criminal. This is not to say 
that these forms of violence were previously nonexistent, 
but rather that they were present at a lower level than the 
generalized, dominant violence and thus only rarely be-
came the subject of explicit attention. Whereas the political 
violence of the past aimed to change the balance of power 
in the state and in society, we are today confronted with an 
explosion of social violence, an increase in anomic viol-
ence, and a steep rise in criminal violence. In addition to 
this shift in the prevalent forms of violence, three other de-
velopments are worthy of note. Firstly, everyday violence 
used to be a phenomenon that occurred primarily in rural 
areas not directly under state control – the large number of 
violent conflicts over land speaks for itself here. In contrast, 
and partly because of the rapid progress of urbanization, 
violence today is a phenomenon associated with urban ag-
glomerations. This has brought about a concomitant 
change in discourses about violence as well as an increase in 
perceived threats and individual feelings of insecurity. Sec-
ondly, the heightened awareness of violence goes hand in 
hand with an awareness of “new” forms of violence which, 
thanks to the prevalent “machismo” culture, were pre-
viously not perceived, or only insufficiently perceived, as vi-
olence at all, such as domestic violence and violence against 
women. Finally, violence has become primarily a phenom-
enon involving adolescents and young adults – another one 
considerably less pronounced in the past.
2. The State of Research
Our brief historical survey has surely made it abundantly 
clear that violence is a long-term and everyday problem in 
Latin America. Violence runs like a leitmotif through the 
history of the subcontinent, starting with the Conquista 
and continuing through the colonial period and slavery as 
a form of violence. The following struggle for indepen-
dence and assertion of the state and the nation, military 
dictatorships, and guerrilla activities all involved violence. 
At the same time, the label “continent of violence” often 
attached to Latin America is rather meaningless, because it 
fails to differentiate. For one thing, one form of violence is 
not the same as another: violence differs in severity and 
(political) motivation. For another, it is important to dis-
tinguish between the different causes and backgrounds. 
Finally, different forms of violence have been prevalent in 
different phases of history, so that at any given time the 
incidence of a specific form of violence may be greater or 
less. And last but not least, each country (and in some cases 
each region of a country) in Latin America has experienced 
a very different pattern of violence, thus precluding sweep-
ing generalizations. That said, there is a general consensus 
that the political, social, and economic costs of violence are 
high. Violence hence represents a grave challenge to all 
states and all societies, and one that needs to be addressed 
constructively in order to identify the causes and back-
ground factors and ultimately in order to find ways of 
combating it appropriately and successfully.
2.1. Some Data on Violence in the Americas
The major wave of violence that has plagued the Latin 
American continent since the 1980s has received much 
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national and international attention, not least because it 
follows on the heels of a phase of intense political or in-
stitutional violence and accompanied the “third wave of 
democratization” (Hagopian and Mainwaring 2005). What 
is more, the kind of violence occurring today can hardly be 
called political any more, but instead takes the form of so-
cial, anomic, or criminal violence. It is an expression of so-
cial and economic, but not of political conflict. In addition, 
the scale and extent of violence are such that they give 
cause for concern. The new forms of violence in the conti-
nent’s major cities like São Paulo, Medellín, or Caracas 
have in a short space of time claimed more victims than 
full-blown wars do elsewhere. According to WHO statistics, 
violence is now one of the leading causes of death among 
people aged 15–44, and some 140,000 murders are com-
mitted each year. The number of injured, maimed, and or-
phaned has also increased drastically over the past two 
decades. For all these reasons international organizations 
like the UN, the World Bank, and research establishments 
in the United States and Europe as well as the Latin Ameri-
can nations themselves are directing renewed attention to 
the various “new” forms of violence.
Although the figures for the various forms of violence are 
incomplete, a number of established facts demonstrate 
quite plainly the scale and extent. If we take as our starting 
point the figures gathered in the WHO’s World Report on 
Violence and Health, we already find a shocking level of vi-
olence illustrated most dramatically by the homicide rates 
and trends. Most of these deaths occur in cities and result 
from interpersonal violence, not wars or armed conflicts. 
They represent a tremendous level of everyday violence.
Country
Argentina
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
Costa Rica
Cuba
Ecuador
El Salvador
Jamaica 
Mexico
Nicaragua
Panama
Paraguay
Puerto Rico
Uruguay
Venezuela
Germany
France
Canada
United States
Source: WHO (2002), 28–29. Ciphers in parentheses indicate the rank of the top five.
Year
1996
1995
1994
1995
1995
1997
1996
1993
1991
1997
1996
1997
1994
1998
1990
1994
1999
1998
1997
1998
Total number of deaths
628
•   20,386 (1)
146
  12,834 (2)
75
348
757
   1,147 (5)
2
   5,991 (3)
139
151
191
538
36
   2,090 (4)
156
91
143
  8,226
Homicides per 100,000 population
Overall
5.2
32.5 (4)
3.0
84.4 (1)
5.5
9.6
15.9
50.2 (2)
---
15.3
7.3
14.4
10.4
41.8 (3)
3.6
25.0 (5)
0.8
0.6
1.7
11.0
Males
8.7
59.6
5.1
156.3
8.4
14.4
29.2
94.8
---
27.8
12.5
25.8
18.7
77.4
4.5
46.4
1.0
0.7
2.5
17.9
Females
1.6
5.2
---
11.9
---
4.6
2.3
6.5
---
2.8
---
---
---
5.3
---
2.8
0.6
0.4
0.9
3.7
Table 1: Homicide rates among youths aged 10–29
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The international homicide rates in the late 1990s – the 
most recent years for which comprehensive data are avail-
able – compiled by the WHO differ considerably between 
one region of the world and another and are especially high 
in Latin America. The only region with higher figures is 
sub-Saharan Africa. Nevertheless, there is considerable vari-
ation within Latin America. Of those countries for which 
data are available at all, Brazil has the highest absolute totals 
for young people – more than 20,000 deaths a year – fol-
lowed at some distance by Colombia (almost 13,000), 
Mexico (almost 6,000), Venezuela (more than 2,000), and 
El Salvador (ca. 1,200). The lowest absolute rates are found 
in Uruguay, Costa Rica, and (at that time still) Jamaica.
If, on the other hand, we look not at the absolute figures 
but at the rates per 100,000 inhabitants, the picture 
changes slightly: Colombia now comes top, with 84 deaths 
per 100,000 inhabitants, followed by 50 per 100,000 in El 
Salvador, just under 42 in Puerto Rico, more than 32 in 
Brazil, and 25 in Venezuela. The lowest rates here are in the 
three Cono Sur countries and in Costa Rica. By com-
parison, rates in Western Europe and North America are 
much lower. Only the United States, with a youth homicide 
rate of 11 per 100,000, comes anywhere close to the lower 
end of the Latin American figures.
However, rates of violence differ not only between major 
regions or countries, but also considerably within countries. 
Thus, in Brazil, for instance, the homicide rate in Recife (al-
most 160 per 100,000) is way above that for São Paulo and 
Rio de Janeiro (ca. 60) and Brasilia and Salvador de Bahia 
(ca. 40). In Colombia, too, there are big discrepancies: 
Whereas in Medellín and Cali the homicide rate is as much 
as 100 per 100,000, in Bogotá it is only 30. The same goes 
for Honduras and Guatemala where some provinces are 
plagued by homicide rates well above the national average, 
while in others there are relatively few homicides (Cohen 
and Rubio 2007). Similarly uneven distribution patterns are 
to be found in all the countries of Latin America.
Several other aspects should also be borne in mind when in-
terpreting the data: First of all, these figures represent a statis-
tical excerpt of the total violence in Latin America. The focus 
on a single year cannot show any historical development; nor 
does it reflect the dramatic increase in violence that has oc-
curred more recently in most of these countries. As far as 
these are available, comparable figures show clearly that viol-
ence (again measured by homicide rates) rose steadily almost 
everywhere between the 1970s and the 1990s. This applies 
equally to those countries with high violence potential and to 
those with a low level of violence, albeit to very different de-
grees. Whereas violence in Colombia, Peru, Panama, and 
Trinidad and Tobago rose five-fold during this period, it 
doubled in Brazil, and rose by half in countries like Venezuela 
and Ecuador. By contrast, the increase was comparatively 
moderate in Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay. In some coun-
tries (such as Mexico) the level remained more or less con-
stant, while in others still (Costa Rica, Paraguay) it even fell 
slightly (Ayres 1998). In the first decade of the new millen-
nium these mixed trends continued. Whereas violence in 
Mexico, Venezuela, and Jamaica underwent a clear increase, it 
decreased slightly in the countries of Central America and in 
Colombia, Brazil, and Peru, and more or less stagnated in the 
rest(Cohen and Rubio 2007; Heinemann and Verner 2006).
The above figures represent only one kind of violent crime, 
namely, murder. Since, however, violence particularly 
among young people does not only take the form of 
murder, we need to look at the data for other, non-fatal 
forms of violent conflict in order to obtain a proper picture 
of the phenomenon of violence. Studies carried out by the 
WHO (2002, 2004) show that for every killing committed, 
another twenty to forty non-fatal acts of violence requiring 
medical intervention are committed. To this we must add 
the undefined, unquantifiable acts of violence that are not 
officially recorded, either because they are not reported or 
because they do not require immediate medical inter-
vention. Rubio (1998b) estimates that only 15–30 percent 
of violent crimes in Latin America are reported. Victimiz-
ation surveys provide an alternative tool for realistic esti-
mates of the extent of crime and violence in the absence of 
reliable statistical data. Underreporting of violence and 
crime is especially severe in poor areas, whereas in middle-
class and rich neighborhoods with similar levels of violence 
levels of reporting are much higher.
Finally, the WHO data also show clear gender difference in 
levels and types of violence. As elsewhere in the world, vi-
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olence is above all a phenomenon associated with young 
males. Everywhere murders are committed they involve 
young women (both as victims and as perpetrators) to a 
much lesser extent than men. We should also bear in mind 
that in Latin America there are strong forms of violence 
against women that are not reflected or recorded in the 
homicide rates (ALOP 2010; CLADEM 1993; CLADEM 
and UNIFEM 2005; Morrison and Biehl 1999; SVRI 2010; 
UNICEF 2000a, 2000b). One general rule of thumb is that 
the higher a country’s homicide rate is, the more likely 
young men are to be the victims and the smaller the pro-
portion of girls and young women affected. In the coun-
tries with the highest homicide rates the ratio is about 1:15. 
It is, however, difficult to obtain reliable information about 
male perpetrators of violence and the exact circumstances 
of their violent behavior because the majority of violent 
crimes are never solved and the rate of crime-solving ac-
tually correlates negatively with the scale of violence.
2.2. Forms and Differentiations of Violence
As we have seen, it is difficult to get precise information 
about the magnitude of violence in its various forms and to 
draw comparisons. The measurement of violence via homi-
cide rates is problematic because it fails to capture non-fatal 
types of violence and crime. Furthermore, homicide rates 
give only a skewed picture of the crime situation because 
the majority of crime tends to be property crime. Using 
only homicide data as a proxy for violence will not yield an 
accurate picture. Another problem is that homicide data are 
not always very reliable and often include other, un-
intentional deaths. Methodologies for violence indicators 
vary across countries, thus making comparisons difficult.
Looking at crime rates and the official data of the security 
institutions involves other problems. The distinction be-
tween crime and violence is not always clear. There is much 
to be said for regarding criminal violence as a component 
of more general violence. A given act of violence may or 
may not be regarded as a crime depending on whether it is 
classified as such by the law. For a long time domestic viol-
ence, which continues to be widespread, was not regarded 
as criminal behavior in Latin America; it was considered to 
be violence but not seen as a crime. Everywhere people 
have become more sensitive to these forms of violence, and 
legal definitions have changed over time. Sometimes crime 
and violence overlap in one or another way, and not every 
criminal act is necessarily violent. “Victimless” crimes like 
prostitution or corruption contain only indirectly elements 
of violence. As a result, it is not easy to fully account for vi-
olence by looking only at the official crime statistics.
Several authors have therefore tried to differentiate be-
tween the various forms of violence and establish robust 
classifications. The whole picture of violence can then be 
categorized according to distinct variables: perpetrator 
(young men, gangs, drug dealers, criminals, etc.), victim 
(women, children, young men, elderly or disabled persons, 
etc.), type (physical, psychological, or sexual), motive 
(political, economical, social, instrumental, emotional, rac-
ist, etc.), or the relations between perpetrator and victim 
(parent/child, peers, friends, acquaintances, strangers, etc.).
Another common way of differentiating between forms of 
violence is to categorize them as self-directed violence, in-
terpersonal violence, or collective violence. Self-directed vi-
olence is violence in which the perpetrator is the victim 
(for example in the case of suicide). In Latin America there 
was a rate of six suicides per 100,000 population in 2001. 
But suicidal violence accounts only for a small part of all 
violence and compared to Asia numbers are particularly 
low (Rosenberg and Fenley 1991; Rosenberg 1991; 
Mathers, Lopez, and Murray 2006). Interpersonal violence 
is the most common form of violence in Latin America. It 
includes all violence inflicted by one individual or a group 
of individuals against another individual or group in such 
different forms as ordinary physical violence between ac-
quaintances, between strangers, or between family 
members and intimates (including forms of sexual viol-
ence, intimate partner violence, child abuse and neglect, 
and abuse of the elderly), youth violence, or violence at the 
workplace (WHO 2002, 2004). Collective violence is com-
mitted by larger groups (organized political groups, mil-
itias, or terrorist organizations) or states (state-sponsored 
violence, para-state forces, state institutions like police and 
the military, war). Collective violence may have a political 
and/or social character depending on its concrete forms 
and intentions. Political violence was long the most promi-
nent form of violence across the Latin America. But not 
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war: deaths related to classical war between countries are 
negligible during the twentieth century throughout the re-
gion (Mares 2001). Compared to nearly every other region 
of the world, war-related deaths are very low.
Whatever classification is used and however violence is cat-
egorized, the extent to which countries in Latin America 
are affected by crime and violence varies significantly. But 
crime and violence levels have been alarmingly on the rise 
since the 1970s. Not only has there been a marked increase 
in levels of crime and violence but also a change in their 
form. Since the 1990s the most visible manifestation of vi-
olence is no longer overt political conflict but crime and 
delinquency. Violence itself is a heterogeneous phenom-
enon with a number of different manifestations like homi-
cides, robberies, kidnappings, muggings, assaults, domestic 
violence, sexual violence, violence against children and the 
elderly, etc. Various forms of violence are seriously under-
reported, as victimization surveys clearly demonstrate. Dif-
ferent socio-economic groups experience violence 
differently: Middle- and high-income neighborhoods are 
mostly affected by property crime, whereas homicides and 
physical assault are much more common in low-income 
neighborhoods. Therefore, the problem of violence is worst 
for those social groups that suffer from social dis-
integration and cultural exclusion. They are the main per-
petrators as well as the main victims. Young men are 
particularly affected. Furthermore, processes of rapid ur-
banization and massive migration have made violence an 
urban phenomenon that is most severe and visible in 
urban settings. The great conurbations account for a large 
part of the violence. Of course, parts of the rural popu-
lation are also affected. A high incidence of ongoing rural 
violence can be found in conflict and post-conflict coun-
tries like El Salvador, Guatemala, or Colombia.
2.3. Actual Violence Scenarios:  
Persisting Forms, Changing Types, New Discourses
Although the delicate process of re-democratization in the 
1980s and 1990s brought about a gradual elimination of 
political violence, the contradictions of democratic govern-
ance, a tradition of impunity, weak political institutions, 
and rising social inequalities have provoked a recent up-
surge of urban violence, a phenomenon that PAHO de-
fined as the “social pandemic” of the late 1990s. The 
growth of violence, and in particular the growing involve-
ment of young people in economic and social violence, 
either as victims or as perpetrators, has become a common 
reality, and a heavy human, social, ethical, and economic 
burden for the different societies.
Political violence has continued to play a more than negli-
gible role only in those countries already affected by civil 
war or popular uprisings (Waldmann 1994, 2009). In Cen-
tral America there was a real escalation after the end of the 
civil war in El Salvador. Although the government and the 
guerrillas concluded a peace agreement in the 1990s, politi-
cal murders remained the order of the day. The situation 
was aggravated by the virulence of youth gangs. In Colom-
bia the state order remained permanently threatened by the 
continuing guerrilla activities of the FARC and other viol-
ent groups, and violence between guerrilla groups and state 
units escalated in regular cycles. A similar escalation of vi-
olence took place in Peru, where the authoritarian Fujimori 
regime inflicted decisive defeats on the Sendero Luminoso 
in the 1990s, albeit itself using terrorist means. A third 
focal point of political violence was Mexico, where the Za-
patista (EZLN) uprising in Chiapas in the mid-1990s, the 
roots of which lay in the strong concentration of land 
ownership in the south of Mexico and in the repeated “re-
forms” of the Ejido system introduced in the wake of the 
Mexican Revolution, was the source of considerable politi-
cal unrest and is a conflict that continues to smoulder.
The last example illustrates very well how different forms 
of violence combine and overlap, as also confirmed by the 
studies of Cristóbal Kay (2000, 2001) who suggests that the 
high potential for rural violence is largely rooted in an un-
equal and exclusionary agrarian socioeconomic system, al-
though the concrete manifestations of violence depend on 
a number of factors, including political circumstances. In 
countries like Colombia or Brazil rural violence is due to 
structural conflicts that characterized since long the 
national land tenure systems and brought about new forms 
of violence in land conflicts in recent years. We notice not 
only a steady and uncontrollable increase in rural crime 
(for example in Colombia), but also the development of a 
political landless worker movement, the Movimento Rural 
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dos Trabalhadores sem Terra in Brazil, which is fighting for 
radical land reform and redistribution.
Although violence has long tended to be discussed in terms 
of homicide rates, domestic violence is in fact the most im-
portant and pervasive type of violence in Latin America 
and the Caribbean, even if its visibility is low (Alméras et 
al. 2002; Brasileiro 1997; Ellsberg, Heise, and Shrader 1999; 
Heise, Pitanguy, and Germain 1994; IDB Technical Note 7; 
Morrison, Ellsberg, and Bott 2004; Montaño and Alméras 
2007; Távara Orozco 2010). There are still several countries 
in Latin America where sexual violence or intimate partner 
violence is not considered a criminal act. Surveys indicate 
that between 10 and 50 percent of women have been 
beaten or physically mistreated by their current or former 
partner (UNICEF 2000b). In up to half of these cases, do-
mestic violence goes hand in hand with sexual or psycho-
logical violence, including physical aggression, sexual 
coercion, forced sexual acts, unwanted sexual comments or 
advances, rape, psychological abuse, and controlling be-
havior. Domestic violence affects many more households 
than criminal victimization. Studies on domestic violence 
reveal that women in the bottom income quintiles are 
more likely to suffer from domestic violence than those in 
the top quintiles. The probability of becoming a victim of 
domestic violence rises sharply as income declines. Em-
pirical evidence suggests that the main risk factor for do-
mestic violence is lack of education. Although women can 
be violent towards men in relationships, and violence exists 
in same-sex partnerships, the largest burden of intimate 
partner violence is inflicted by men against their female 
partners. Another important aspect of domestic violence is 
violence against children (CISALVA 2005; CONAPINA and 
CODENI 2005; Concha-Eastman and Benguigui 2007; 
Mora 2008; Pinheiro 2006a, 2006b; Venanzi 2003). Child 
abuse and neglect includes all forms of physical or emo-
tional ill-treatment, sexual abuse, neglect or negligent 
treatment, or commercial or other exploitation resulting in 
actual or potential harm to the child’s health and devel-
opment. It is estimated that six million minors in the re-
gion suffer severe maltreatment and that eighty thousand 
die each year as a result of injuries caused by parents, 
relatives, or others. Recent studies (Heinemann and Verner 
2006; Cohen and Rubio 2007) show that sexual abuse is a 
frequent phenomenon in urban Latin America concerning 
up to two million children and adolescents in Colombia 
and up to one million in Mexico. Public health specialists 
are particularly concerned about violence against children 
because of its devastating future effects: Maltreatment of 
children has significant negative effects on human capital 
and maltreated or abused children are highly likely to be-
come violent perpetrators themselves. They therefore con-
sider the prevention of violence against children as an 
important form of primary violence prevention.
In contrast to domestic violence, youth violence is highly 
visible, whether in the form of gangs, in schools, or on the 
streets (Boehnke 2002; Benvenuti 2003; CEPAL 2000; Cun-
ningham, McGinnis, and García Verdu 2008; Daiute and 
Fine 2003; Frías Armenta and Corral Verdugo 2004; Hein 
and Barrientos 2004; Moro 2006; Maddaleno, Concha-
Eastman, and Marques 2007; McAlister 2000; Melo 2008; 
Moser and Bronkhorst 1999; Muncie 2004; PAHO 2000; 
Pinheiro 2007; Redondo 2001; Reis and Tejeda 2008; Serra 
Hoffman, Knox, and Cohen 2010; Sommers 2006; Tonry 
and Moore 1998; UNDP 2006; UNICEF 2001; USAID 
2004; Watts 1998; Weaver and Maddaleno 1999). In Latin 
America and the Caribbean, both the perpetrators and vic-
tims of violence are mostly young and male. For 2000, the 
WHO estimated the homicide rate for Latin American 
youth (aged 10–29) at more than 36 per 100,000, more 
than double the African rate. In the Caribbean, an esti-
mated 80 percent of violent crimes are committed by men, 
most of them under 35, with an increasing number under 
14. In the major Latin American cities, the vast majority of 
homicide victims are men, 60 percent of them between the 
ages of 15 and 29 (WHO 2002). Youth violence often oc-
curs in the context of gangs (BID 2006; Castillo 2004; 
Covey 2003; Encinas 1994; Jones and Rodgers 2009; Klein 
1995, 2005; Kontos, Brotherton, and Barrios 2003; Monod 
2002; Nájar 2004; PAHO and WHO 1997; Pellicer Palacin 
2007; Ranum 2007; Reguillo 2000; Rodgers 1999; Rubio 
2007; Strocka 2006; WOLA 2006a, 2006b). Although some 
female gangs are known (Mendoza-Denton 2008; Sanchez 
and Rodríguez 2008), gangs are primarily a male phenom-
enon and members tend to come from economically de-
prived urban areas. They flourish in environments where 
the established social order is weak or has broken down 
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and social bonds are tenuous. Youth gangs are known all 
over Latin America, starting in the 1960s in major cities 
like Mexico, Guayaquil, Bogotá, São Paulo, and Rio de Ja-
neiro; currently they are a major problem in Central 
America. For many young people the gang is a way of life 
(Barker 2005; Botello and Moya 2005; Briceño-León and 
Zubillaga 2001; Sanchez 2000; Zubillaga 2003). Gang viol-
ence includes murder and assaults as well as robberies, 
theft, kidnapping, and other forms. Although it is a form of 
social violence, it has aspects of criminal and anomic viol-
ence, depending on the nature of the gang. The explosion 
of youth violence in Latin America has given rise to all 
kinds of concerns in recent years. Therefore youth violence 
will be discussed separately below (section 3).
Drugs and violence constitute another major problem for 
at least some of the Latin American countries (UNODC 
2007a, 2007b). With U.S. and European consumers main-
taining their high demand for drugs produced in Latin 
America, the drug trade is a tremendously profitable busi-
ness. Latin American countries produce an estimated nine 
hundred tonnes of cocaine annually with a market worth 
of some $60 billion. The value of the drugs trade often riv-
als that of the legitimate economies of the nations through 
which it flows. The precise routes involved have changed 
over time, as have the destinations themselves. When the 
big Colombian cartels controlled the market most cocaine 
was transported in private aircraft stopping over in the Ca-
ribbean. Today, most of the traffic is maritime, hugging the 
coasts of Central America, as the dominant distributors are 
Mexican cartels. Large flows of cocaine pass through Cen-
tral America and Mexico, thus explaining the high rates of 
violence associated with drug trafficking in these countries. 
Another important reason for the rising violence as-
sociated with drugs is the changing origins of heroin pro-
duced for the United States. Since the 1990s most heroin 
comes not from Asia but from Latin American countries, 
especially Colombia, Guatemala, and Mexico which are the 
greatest producers. In contrast to the large flows of drugs 
there are remarkably low levels of local use. The drug traf-
fic that has flourished in the last two decades and has 
spread to ever more countries – partly as a paradoxical re-
sult of the efforts for stricter control and interdiction – has 
contributed substantially to the recent crime wave. On the 
one side, drug traffickers have boosted the availability of 
firearms in Latin America, making it easier for individuals 
to commit crimes and making these crimes more violent. 
On the other side, young people are socialized into crime 
and violence when they try to get access to the income op-
portunities of the drug trade under conditions of high un- 
and underdevelopment and social exclusion. Furthermore, 
in the case of guerilla activities in Colombia or Peru, there 
is a growing intersection between purely criminal and 
political violence. Guerilla activities are often financed 
through the drug trade, thus allowing rebel groups to sur-
vive although they have already lost the fight politically. 
Furthermore, the “war on drugs” conducted by some Latin 
American governments – and in some cases supported 
militarily by the United States – has led to a further esca-
lation of violence and a rising death toll. Recent experi-
ences in Colombia and current strategies to combat drug 
trafficking in northern Mexico clearly show the power of 
the cartels and the problems faced by governments seeking 
to regain control.
With the rapid rise of crime and violence, citizen security 
has become a major concern for Latin Americans (Andrade 
2005; Arriagada and Godoy 1999; Carrión 2002; Carrión 
and Dammert 2009; Dammert 2004a, 2004b, 2007a, 2007b; 
Dammert and Paulsen 2005; Davis 2006; Diamint 2004; Es-
cobar 2005; Pegoraro 2000; Pontón and Santillán 2008; 
Rico and Chinchilla 2002; Rivera 2008; Santillán, Pontón, 
and Pontón 2007; Sozzo 1999; Waldmann 2002; WOLA 
1998). Latinobarómetro polls show delinquency among the 
top concerns of the population along with unemployment, 
poverty, and corruption (Latinobarómetro 2010). The 
same polls reveal low levels of interpersonal trust. During 
recent years people have felt ever more insecure and con-
sider the security situation of their city or barrio as critical. 
In recent years, up to 40 percent in the different countries 
report having become a victim of violence. Consequently, 
fear of victimization is rising. Often the public does not re-
gard the police and other state authorities as guarantors of 
security and order but, on the contrary, as an additional se-
curity risk (for example in Mexico, in some places in the 
Andes, and in Brazil) (Brinks 2007; Candina and Frühling 
2001; Schmid 2007; Sozzo 2005, 2008; Tulchin and Ruthen-
berg 2008; Waldmann 1996). Corruption, insufficient and 
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above all badly trained staff, low pay, inadequate equip-
ment, and little willingness to cooperate with local civil so-
ciety actors in city neighborhoods are regarded as the worst 
problems. Trust in the police is also low because violent 
police raids and corrupt behavior are often the rule rather 
than the exception. For this reason police reform has been 
considered an urgent matter for many years now (Dam-
mert and Bailey 2005; Frühling 2001; López-Portillo and 
Frühling 2008; Sain 2010; Uildriks 2009; Vanderschueren 
2002). Many crimes are not even reported, and those who 
can afford them prefer to employ private security services 
to get a degree of personal protection. Many well-off 
people live in gated communities, while others from the 
middle class barricade themselves behind high walls or 
alarmed fences and live in houses with bars on the 
windows and doors, sophisticated alarm systems, or large 
guard-dogs. The downside of people’s experience of being 
victims and their fear of crime is an increasingly punitive 
attitude: many advocate far more stringent policing 
measures, or sometimes even military action (Bailey and 
Dammert 2007), approve of “social purging” (“limpiezas 
sociales”) by para-state units, call for heftier sentences, sup-
port the death penalty, or arm themselves in order to pro-
tect their property and their families. In the poorer areas of 
Latin America lynch justice has become a routine in-
strument for those who can count neither on police pro-
tection nor on punishment of perpetrators by an 
overburdened justice system (Rubio 1999). In a situation 
where people feel devoid of protection and at the mercy of 
criminals, lynching is seen as a legitimate form of taking 
the law into one’s own hands in order to obtain justice for 
the victims (Huggins 1991; Rodríguez Guillén and Mora 
Heredia 2006; Snodgrass Godoy 2004, 2006).
Polls like Latinobarómetro also suggest that violence toler-
ance levels differ across societies and that perceptions of vi-
olence levels do not always match reality. Thus threat 
perceptions have risen steeply even in areas where rates of 
violence are not actually that high or where forms of social 
violence have had only a small role to play in the past (Ar-
gentina, Chile, Uruguay). In many cases perceptions of vi-
olence are influenced by media reporting or public 
discourse, which leads to considerable misconceptions 
about the real situation (for example in Central America). 
Interestingly, many Latin Americans seem to feel less secure 
than they actually are.
2.4. Some Remarks about the Specificities of Violence in Different Countries
As we have seen, different Latin American countries are af-
fected by crime and violence in very different ways and ex-
hibit very different cycles of violence. Thus there is a need 
not only to record and describe violent phenomena in gen-
eral, but also to perform separate evaluations for each 
country in order to focus on the specific peculiarities of vi-
olence in individual countries. Without such evaluations, it 
is impossible to show why certain countries and regions are 
more severely affected by violence than others or to suggest 
explanations for this phenomenon. Additionally, this ap-
proach yields a clearer picture of who is involved in viol-
ence research in the various regions as well as of the topics 
and aspects of violence that have been the focus of par-
ticular attention in recent years. While it can be noted that 
violence research in Latin America is by no means an 
underdeveloped field of research – in fact, violence in all its 
various facets is a major focus of scholarship in many Latin 
American countries – the field has suffered for many years 
from poor networking. Additionally, sociological violence 
research has very little public impact and limited influence 
on public policy.
2.4.1. Mexico
In Mexico, violence was for many years a marginal issue 
which, while present in the awareness of the relevant ex-
perts, did not become the subject of wider public dis-
course. According to Johns (1995), the main reasons for 
this were: Firstly, Mexico’s self-image as a proud nation 
with a long history and a unique identity prevented the de-
velopment of an adequate awareness of the various per-
mutations of violence. Where violence was committed, it 
was viewed as a relic of history (the legacy of colonial rule 
or of Catholicism) which needed to be overcome, but not 
perceived or addressed as a Mexican problem as such. Sec-
ondly, the long hegemony of the PRI as the official party 
prevented violence becoming an issue of public sig-
nificance. Due to its semi-authoritarian character and an 
ingenious system of patronage and dependency, the party 
was not only able to exercise relatively strong control over 
discourses about violence, but often also to avert impend-
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ing violence before it broke out. Thirdly, violence in Mexi-
co was for many years a rural phenomenon. In the 1980s, 
the rates were highest in the south of the country, where 
the states of Guerrero and Oaxaca recorded just under 40 
murders per 100,000 residents. In 1985 alone, 1,312 
murders were committed in Oaxaca without the issue 
being addressed in public discourse. This may be con-
nected with the fact that, even today, the region remains 
one of the country’s poorest and most backward with a 
largely indigenous population and a long history of con-
flicts related to the distribution of land. When the focus of 
violence then shifted further north in the 1990s – partly 
owing to the drug trade – levels of violence in the south 
nevertheless remained high. Fourthly, Mexico continues to 
be dominated by a strong culture of “machismo” which, 
for instance, automatically assumes that the husband is the 
head of the household and systematically trivialises or ig-
nores violence against women and children (Frias 2009; 
Gutman 1996). Fifthly and finally, the actual figures for vi-
olent crime after the Revolution and after the beginning of 
PRI rule showed a declining trend for several decades, so 
that reporting focused less on the violence that still oc-
curred than on these decreases in frequency (Hernández 
Bringas 1989; Damiron 2008).
Even though significant levels of interpersonal violence – 
including violence against fringe groups – have persisted 
over the years in the major cities, the public perception of 
violence has changed dramatically in recent times. This is 
primarily the result of events that catapulted the issue to 
center-stage in the public debate. The Zapatist (EZLN) re-
bellion in Chiapas in the 1990s was the initial wake-up call 
for government and society alike, because the uprising re-
vitalized political violence and drew on traditions dating 
back to the Mexican Revolution (Díaz-Polanco 1997; Es-
trada Saavedra 2008; Harvey 1998; Hernández Navarro 
1995; Reyes Ramos 2001). The unsolved agrarian question 
in the south of the country, the relative backwardness and 
poverty of the region, and the effects of neo-liberal policies 
on rural areas triggered the violent uprising of the popu-
lation under Comandante Marcos (Arnson and Benítez 
Manaut 2000; Bobrow-Strain 2007; Le Bot 1997). The re-
turn of violence as a subject of public discourse in Mexico 
was also due to the mass murders of women in Ciudad Juá-
rez on the Mexican-American border (Bowden 2010; 
Dominguez-Ruvalcaba and Corona 2010; Gutiérrez Cast-
añeda 2004; Löffler 2007). The background to these 
murders of young maquiladora workers in the northern 
Mexican border town – described as femicide because of 
the macabre ways in which the women were raped, tor-
tured, and killed – remains unsolved to this day, even 
though the murders triggered a wave of outrage (Jiménez 
Ornelas 2004; Monárrez Fragoso 2002, 2006; Monárrez 
Fragoso and Tabuenca 2007; Panther 2008; Rodríguez 
2007; Staudt 2008). Finally, it was the unbridled violence 
connected with the drug trade in the north of the country 
that terrified the population of the states of Chihuahua and 
Sinaloa (Freeman 2006; Fuentes Romero 2007a, 2007b; 
Grayson 2009; Velasco 2007). In particular, war between 
rival cartels for control of routes and territory, together 
with concerted attempts by the Mexican government to 
contain the cartels, have caused the situation to escalate 
still further. Since 2006, Mexico has found itself confronted 
with a spiral of violence unknown since the days of the 
Mexican Revolution, which has seen the murder of almost 
35,000 people in the northern states. Luis Astorga in par-
ticular (1995, 2003a, 2003b, 2003c, 2004a, 2004b, 2005, 
2007a, 2007b) has published many studies on the drug 
trade and its historical, political, and cultural dimensions; 
his works represent a major contribution to the under-
standing of this dramatic escalation of violence.
There are no comprehensive studies on violence in Mexico 
(González Casanova and Ramírez Braulio 2008). However, 
a rough idea of its extent can be gained from studies by the 
Mexican Ministry of Health (Secretaría de Salud 2006; 
Fundación Mexicana para la Salud 1998) and CIDAC 
(2009). INEGI (2003) also publishes data about violence. 
CIDAC categorizes violence into murders, executions, auto 
theft, and a residual category. The murder rate is a com-
paratively reliable indicator for the extent of violence, since 
almost all murders are officially registered. The category of 
executions, on the other hand, is of major significance both 
because it indicates the extent of violence between organ-
ized criminal gangs and because it registers powerfully in 
public awareness (increasing feelings of insecurity and vul-
nerability). Auto thefts provide a representative impression 
of the degree to which the public is endangered by armed 
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groups. The residual category simply lists all reported viol-
ent crimes that were committed in the various states. These 
studies show a murder rate far above the national average 
in the states of Oaxaca (16.4 per 100,000 residents), Chi-
huahua (15.0), México (14.3), Guerrero (13.4), Sinaloa 
(12.0), and Nayarit (11.5). The figures for executions (once 
again given per 100,000 residents) are highest by a wide 
margin in the northern states of Chihuahua (32.1), Dur-
ango (17.6), and Sinaloa (17.5), roughly reflecting the de-
gree to which each of these states is affected by the drug 
cartels. Auto thefts are most frequent in the states of Baja 
California (18.9 per 1,000 vehicles), Chihuahua (17.0), and 
México (13.2). With regard to the remainder category, the 
country’s capital, Mexico City (Distrito Federal) tops the 
list with 25,457 crimes per 100,000 residents, followed by 
the states of México, Tamaulipas, Baja California, Chihua-
hua, Nuevo León, Puebla, Quintana Roo, Guanajuato, and 
Jalisco, all of which have between 10,000 and 15,000 crimes 
per 100,000 residents. These figures may reflect the high 
degree of urbanization in these regions, with its con-
comitant population density and considerable tendencies 
to marginalization (Perea 2008c; Tépach Marcial 2005).
The situation of research on youth violence in Mexico is 
rather paradoxical. On the one hand, Mexico is the country 
with the highest standards for investigations on youth af-
fairs throughout Latin America. On the other hand, there 
are virtually no such investigations. Only during the 1980s 
was there a wave of publications about “chavos banda” or 
youth gangs (Zermeno, Zicardi, and Castillo 1988; García-
Robles 1987; Gomezjara et al. 1987; León 1984; Villafuerte, 
López, and Nava 1984). Nowadays, studies about youth vi-
olence and social conflict have nearly disappeared for two 
reasons: First and foremost, surveys of youth violence are 
part of the aforementioned collective awareness of violence 
in Mexico. Secondly, the praiseworthy attempt to decrimi-
nalize young people had the consequence of reducing re-
search conflict and violence among young people. 
Nonetheless, the issue is addressed by Valenzuela (1988), 
Hristoulas (2006), Nateras (2007), Perea (2008a), and Val-
déz (2009). A recent thesis on violence deals in more detail 
with the migratory flows of the “mareros” from Central 
America to California (Narváez 2007), including some re-
marks on Mexico.
Violence against women and children has become an ever 
more important research topic since the 1990s (INEGI 
2003). Although some of the literature deals with the case 
of the women of Ciudad Juárez, there is also a growing lit-
erature on domestic violence in Mexico (Agoff et al. 2006; 
Knaul and Ramírez 2005; Torres Falcon 2002). Although 
countrywide data for this phenomenon are not available 
and the estimated number of unrecorded occurrences is 
extremely high (Jiménez 2005), studies for Mexico City in-
dicate that violence is an everyday phenomenon in one out 
of three homes in the region of the capital city (CESOP 
2005). In the overwhelming majority of these cases, the vi-
olence is committed by the (generally male) head of the 
household or husband, while women and children are 
usually the victims. Domestic violence has many facets, 
ranging from physical violence such as beating, spanking, 
and rape through symbolic violence like yelling, insults, 
and verbal humiliation to various forms of intimidation, 
neglect, and contempt. Justifications for this violence are 
derived from traditional social norms about the rights and 
duties of men and women, from assigned gender roles and 
gender hierarchies, and also to a significant degree from 
the country’s pronounced “macho” culture (Frias 2009; 
Herrera Carnevale 2007). All three of these factors, how-
ever, have exhibited clear signs of erosion in recent years, so 
that women are increasingly likely to defend themselves 
and to report domestic violence to the authorities. Elena 
Azaola is one of several researchers who has spent years 
studying violence against women and children and the re-
lationship of women to the police and the prison system 
(Azaola and Estes 2003; Azaola 1996, 2008).
In recent years, the increasing escalation of violence has 
brought the issue of public safety into sharper focus (Cen-
tro de Análisis de Políticas Públicas 2010). However, dis-
cussions about public safety in Mexico generally center 
around the inadequacies of the security forces and the 
weaknesses of the police and the justice system in prosecut-
ing and punishing crimes. This problem has intensified 
considerably in recent years (CIDAC 2009). There is un-
animous agreement that the country still lacks an inte-
grated vision of crime-fighting that includes the 
prevention of violent crime. There is an urgent need to im-
prove professionalism among the police forces, whose cor-
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ruption and brutality itself represents a considerable 
security risk to the people, as well as in the legal system, to 
enable it to effectively uphold justice against crime and vi-
olence. Criminal trials are currently conducted with no re-
gard for transparency; the courts operate at the discretion 
of the judges and are prone to corruption as well as ex-
hibiting class and racial biases. A huge number of crimes 
goes entirely unpunished; according to some estimates, 
over 90 percent of criminal acts never come before the 
courts at all and thus incur no legal penalties. Due to the 
inconsistency and repeated interruption of efforts on the 
part of the security forces, no progress has been made to 
date in reforming and strengthening the relevant in-
stitutions (Jiménez 2006). In the face of the drug wars in 
the north of the country, current efforts to end the violence 
are openly geared towards the problematic strategy of mili-
tarizing the police (Aguiar 2006; Bergman 2007). At the 
other extreme, we find a phenomenon which Elena Azaola 
and others describe as penal populism: systematically in-
creasing penalties and raising sentences without a simulta-
neous increase in arrest rates (Arteaga Botello 2006a, 
2006b). Of the roughly 225,000 prison inmates, only 7 per-
cent are serving sentences for serious crimes, while almost 
half spend protracted periods in pre-trial detention during 
the course of an investigation. The remainder are in prison 
for petty crimes. In many cases, the stigma of having spent 
time in prison causes these people to become more deeply 
involved in a criminal environment.
2.4.2. Central America
The phenomenon of violence is a serious one in most 
countries of Central America (UNODC 2007a). But it is 
important to note that underdevelopment as such does not 
cause crime, because the poorest nations and individuals 
are not always the most crime-prone. In Central America, 
the safest countries are arguably the richest (Costa Rica) 
and the poorest (Nicaragua). But there are other aspects of 
underdevelopment, such as extreme social inequality and 
great rural poverty, that make it more likely for a country 
to experience violence and crime. Wealth disparities pro-
vide criminals with both a justification (addressing social 
injustice) and an opportunity (wealth to steal) for their ac-
tivities, as well as generating “expressive violence”. What is 
more, feelings of resentment over inequality tend to be ex-
acerbated when class divisions fall along ethnic lines, as 
they often do.
All of the countries in the region have been affected by 
serious conflicts, including civil wars in Guatemala 
(1960–96), El Salvador (1980–92), and Nicaragua 
(1972–79, and then the Contra war until 1991) (Brockett 
2005; Kruijt 2008; Lungo Uclés 1996; May 2001; Martí i 
Puig and Figueroa 2006; Torres-Rivas 1993; Vilas 1995; 
Wood 2003). Together with the authoritarian responses to 
insurgent uprisings, these conflicts have devastated econ-
omies and societies. The impact was profound, and the 
repercussions are still manifest today. Terror tactics were 
used in a number of cases, including public massacres of 
civilians, “disappearances”, death squads, torture, and mass 
rape, as the reports of the various truth and reconciliation 
commissions reveal. A large share of the population wit-
nessed, experienced, or participated in these atrocities, and 
this has produced widespread trauma. Conflict introduced 
small arms (Godnick, Muggah, and Waszink 2002; PNUD 
2003) and taught the practical and psychological skills 
required for their use. Conflict also ripped apart commu-
nities and undermined trust, thus degrading the mech-
anisms of informal crime prevention that provide the 
stoutest checks on anti-social behavior. In countries like El 
Salvador and Guatemala the incidence of violence was 
higher in the postwar period than during the civil wars 
(Bourgois 2001; Little and Smith 2009; Moser and McIl-
waine 2000; UNDP 1998).
The existence of gangs in Central America has been a 
major theme for researchers from the region and abroad 
(Aguilar Villamariona 2006b; Winton 2005; Barnes; Brevé 
2007; Cruz 2005a, 2005b, 2005c, 2007; Demoscopía 2007; 
ERIC/IDESO/IDIES/IUDOP 2001–2006; Frank 2010; Men-
cía 2006, 2007; Muñoz 2007; Peetz 2005; Ribando 2005; 
Rocha and Rodgers 2008; Rodgers 2000; Rubio 2005; Save-
nije 2007a, 2007b; SIDA 2008; WOLA 2006a, 2006b). 
Gangs (called “pandillas” or “maras”) have existed in Cen-
tral America for some time, and they are considered to be 
one of the most important consequences of the civil wars 
in the region. During the civil wars, large numbers of Cen-
tral Americans sought refuge in the United States, mainly 
in the Hispanic slums of Southern California. These areas 
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suffered from serious gang problems during the 1970s and 
1980s, and many of the immigrants found themselves tar-
geted by local gangs. At this time, young Salvadoran men 
formed the Mara Salvatrucha, one of the most notorious 
and wide-ranging street gangs in the Western hemisphere. 
Its reach was extended back to El Salvador and throughout 
Central America when immigration laws were tightened in 
1996 and members were repatriated after completing their 
jail sentences. They came back to marginalized urban areas 
with minimal access to basic services, high levels of youth 
unemployment compounded by insufficient access to edu-
cational opportunities, overwhelmed and ineffective justice 
systems, easy access to arms and an illicit economy, dys-
functional families, and high levels of intra-familial viol-
ence (Arana 2005a, 2005b; Alvarez, Zubieta, and Villareal 
Sotelo 2007). Furthermore, a demographic youth bulge 
created a cohort of youth without jobs, decent education, 
or realistic expectations of employment, thus fuelling gang 
membership. Besides Mara Salvatrucha there are several 
other gangs, the most famous being Mara 18 and Mara 
Marabunta (Bähr 2004; Concha-Eastman and Santacruz 
2001; Savenije 2004; Vaquera and Bailey 2004; USAID 
2006). While assessing the scale of the gangs is difficult, 
there are an estimated seventy thousand gang members in 
Central America today, with Honduras, El Salvador and 
Guatemala being the worst affected.
The deportation issue is a key concern for many nations in 
Central America and in the Caribbean. Many researchers 
claim that criminals schooled in the United States con-
tribute to crime and violence in their home countries when 
deported. The effect of U.S. gang culture on Central 
American youth gangs is estimated to be strong. On the 
other hand, estimates vary on the extent to which gang 
members are responsible for the rising crime levels in their 
respective countries. In Honduras, the maras have been 
blamed for the bulk of violent crime, but research indicates 
that less than 5 percent of all crime is committed by people 
under 18 years of age. In El Salvador, it is claimed that 60 
percent of all intentional homicides are carried out by 
maras, but again, the evidence for this conclusion is un-
clear. In Guatemala, a recent police study revealed that only 
14 percent of all intentional homicides can be attributed to 
gang activities. Equally important, the supposed con-
nection between maras and drug trafficking is by no means 
clear. Nevertheless, gang members in Central America are 
involved in many acts of violence and crime, such as ex-
tortion, often “taxing” various forms of public trans-
portation, or demanding payment from businesses 
enjoying their “protection” (Rubio 2006; WOLA 2006a; 
UNODC 2007a).
Two further points distinguish the Central American situ-
ation from violence and crime in other regions. One is the 
aforementioned extent of exposure to drug flows and its vi-
olent and corruptive implications (UNODC 2007a), the 
other is the overall rate of violence since the end of the civil 
wars. Exceptions are Costa Rica (Bustamente 2004), and to 
a certain extent Nicaragua (Dirinpro, Nitlapan, and Ideso 
2004; Gómez 2006; Oettler 2009; Rocha 2006), where gangs 
are nearly absent and levels of violence are much lower 
than in the neighboring countries (Carcach 2008; CIEN 
2002; Cordero and Vargas 2007; Cruz, Trigueros, and Gon-
zález 2000a, 2000b; FUNDASAL 2005; Hume 2009; Leyva 
2001; Pineda and Bolaños 2009; PNUD 2007; Zepeda 
López 2005). All other countries have recorded homicide 
rates of more than annual 100 deaths per 100,000 inhabit-
ants in recent years. Key to this issue is the availability of 
firearms. Reputable sources estimate that there are half a 
million legally registered firearms in Central America, and 
an estimated 800,000 unregistered firearms in civilian 
hands. Firearms are used to commit more than 70 percent 
of all homicides in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. 
Especially in El Salvador and Guatemala, no adequate ef-
forts have been made to understand or deal with this phe-
nomenon. Furthermore, violent crime including armed 
robbery, banditry, assault, kidnapping, sexual assault, and 
carjacking is common, especially in San Salvador.
High murder rates are generally associated with high rates 
of violence against women and children. While most 
murder victims are male, several countries in the region 
show an unusually high share of female victims (for ex-
ample Guatemala). Although data on domestic violence are 
limited, those that do exist clearly show that organized 
crime and anomic violence are not the only sources of viol-
ence in the region (Menjívar 2008; McClusky 2001; Zur 
2001).
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It comes as no surprise that security policies are a major 
topic of concern in Central America. Some studies show 
that security policies that hinge on suppressing gang ac-
tivities may fail to address the core crime issues. Heavy-
handed crackdowns on street gangs, such as the “mano 
dura” policies pursued in El Salvador, do not address the 
causes of violence in these societies and must be considered 
counter-productive (Aguilar 2007; Thale 2006). Violence 
by young people is real and in need of attention, but it is a 
symptom, rather than the cause, of the underlying forms of 
structural violence. But the “mano dura” is not the only 
answer to violence in the region. There are many proposals 
for containing and preventing violent behavior that some-
times even include civil society. One important difference 
between the countries of the Central American isthmus is 
the much more enlightened way to deal with youth viol-
ence in Nicaragua and Costa Rica that did not lead to such 
heavy escalations of violence than in El Salvador and Gu-
atemala (CCPVJ 2009; Chinchilla 2004; Falkenburger 2007; 
Rivera 2005; Rocha 2008).
As a result of the widespread violence in Central America, 
public insecurity is another topic on the political agendas 
of these countries. On the one side, the phenomenon is ad-
dressed via repressive policies against perpetrators to up-
hold public order and secure at least a certain measure of 
civility (FESPAD and CEPES 2004; Jütersonke, Muggah, 
and Rodgers 2009). On the other side, there are studies 
about the ways violence is perceived by the people. These 
studies often deal with the sensation of violence produced 
in media discourses. But they lead only to a more or less 
correct picture of the amount of violence and the individ-
ual dangers associated with it. We have to conclude there-
fore that media reports or television programs structure 
the perception of violence in important ways (Huhn, 
Oettler, and Peetz 2005, 2006a, 2006b; Huhn 2008a, 2008b; 
Oettler 2007; Peetz 2008).
Needless to say, besides dealing with the different forms of 
violence and crime some literature on Central America also 
assesses the impact of violence on development (Cruz and 
Romano 1998; UNODC 2007a): crime erodes social and 
human capital, crime means bad prospects for economic 
development, and in the end crime undermines democracy.
2.4.3. Caribbean Countries
High levels of violence and crime are one of the most 
troubling and pressing problems of the Caribbean region. 
As a UNODC study reports (2007b), the Caribbean is 
highly vulnerable to crime for several reasons: It suffers 
from a geographical location between the producers and 
consumers of various drugs; as small islands, the Carib-
bean countries have long coastlines where it is difficult to 
enforce law; the police, courts, and prisons of the small 
criminal justice systems are easily overwhelmed; police 
have to deal with massive tourist inflows that exceed the 
local population; the region has one of the highest prison-
er-to-population ratios in the world; and finally, a number 
of countries here have experienced periods of political in-
stability, which may have an impact on violence and crime.
Despite this generalizing picture, the Caribbean is a highly 
diverse region, resulting from different and changing colo-
nial powers that left their language, culture and politics in 
the area, very different levels of development (for example 
Barbados is highly developed, Haiti is extremely poor), and 
populations ranging from 4,000 in Montserrat to over 11 
million in Cuba. Generalizations with regard to violence 
and crime should be avoided, not least because crime vic-
tim surveys are extremely problematic for different reasons. 
Murder figures are generally considered the most reliable 
indicator of violent crime in a country, but even here de-
finitions of murder vary widely. There are great differences 
between countries, ranging from Cuba on the one side to 
Puerto Rico, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago on the other 
(Avril 2001; Brea de Cabral and Cabral 2009, 2010; Crequi 
1995; Francis and Harriott 2003; Harriott 2003a, 2003b, 
2003c, 2003d; Lawton 2008; Le Franc et al. 2008; Moser and 
Holland 1997; Sives 1997; World Bank 1996).
Taking a closer look, the available data (UNODC 2007b) 
reveal that homicide rates are highest in Jamaica where 
homicide rates have exploded since 1982 to reach more 
than 50 per 100.000 in 2006. The murder rate in Guayana 
has been a subject of frequent alarm in the country, but 
there is no clear trend. During the last two decades murder 
rates ranged between 75 and 125 annually. The Dominican 
Republic, St. Lucia, and Trinidad and Tobago show rapidly 
rising rates since the year 2000. In the Dominican Republic 
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the homicide rate almost doubled, in St. Lucia it more than 
doubled, and in Trinidad and Tobago it more than quad-
rupled. According to police statistics, the French départ-
ments in the Caribbean also show remarkably high murder 
rates, despite their relative affluence. Out of the one 
hundred French départments, Guiana ranks first in terms 
of homicide, Guadeloupe and Martinique rank third and 
fourth. So homicide rates in the Caribbean are quite high 
by world standards. And in most of these countries homi-
cide rates seem to be rising quite rapidly.
Domestic violence against women and children is another 
major concern (Blank 2007; Cáceres Cruz et al. 2002; 
Danns 1989; Haaded 2003; Lazarus-Black 2007; Rawlins 
2000). Violence against women affects a significant per-
centage of women and girls in the Caribbean. Although 
rape is greatly underreported everywhere in the world, ac-
cording to the latest available CTS data three of the top ten 
recorded rape rates occur in the Caribbean, with the Baha-
mas followed by St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and Ja-
maica. In the Dominican Republic, women between the age 
of 15 and 34 account for nearly two-thirds of all violent 
deaths of women, despite only representing 36 percent of 
the female population. At highest risk are young women 
who are domestic workers or have recently ended an inti-
mate relationship. In two-thirds of cases the perpetrator is 
the victim’s husband (boyfriend) or ex-husband, followed 
by mothers and fathers (ALEPH 2006; Caceres and Estevez 
2004). Police statistics offer only a very incomplete picture 
of violence against women, since the majority of the inci-
dents are not reported to police. The lack of reliable vic-
timization surveys makes it very difficult to get precise 
information on other forms of violence against women, 
but physical and psychological maltreatment are frequent 
throughout the Caribbean. Ideas and values of masculinity 
seem to belong to the root causes of violence against 
women in the Caribbean (Chevannes 2001; Harriott 2002; 
Reddock 2004; Román Tirado 2003; Sukhu 2006).
Property crime seems to be more frequent in the wealthier 
countries than in the poorer ones. Generally, data on prop-
erty crime are far less reliable than other forms of violence 
because the rate of reporting varies greatly between jurisdic-
tions and across time (Bowling 2010; Foglesong and Stone 
2007; Harriott 2006a, 2006d, 2009). Wealthier countries may 
have much higher rates of property crime than poorer 
countries simply because there are stronger incentives for re-
porting victimization where many more people have insur-
ance. The best-reported property crime is vehicle theft.
Potential risk factors for crime and violence encompass 
conditions on different levels. Only murder and robbery 
rates show no clear relation to possible explanatory vari-
ables (Francis and Harriott 2003; Harriott, Braithwaite, and 
Wortley 2004; Román 2006; Sookram et al. 2009). House-
hold-level victimization data from Jamaica, Haiti, and the 
Dominican Republic show a more pronounced profile of 
risk factors (UNODC 2007b): Poorer households in poor 
communities face a higher risk of violent crime, while 
property crime often strikes the wealthy. A large popu-
lation of young men in a community is associated with 
higher levels of crime in Jamaica and the Dominican Re-
public. Crime is highly concentrated in urban areas and in 
most cases in areas with a high population density (Robin-
son, Levy, and Baker 2008; World Bank 1996). A wide va-
riety of risk factors contribute to the prevalence of youth 
violence (Lewis and Carter 1995; World Bank 2003), in-
cluding poverty, youth unemployment, large-scale mi-
gration to urban areas, drug trafficking, a weak education 
system, ineffective policing, the widespread availability of 
weapons, drug and alcohol abuse, and the presence of or-
ganized gangs (OAS 2007).
Organized violence is mainly related to drug trafficking 
(Clarke 2006a, 2006b; Figueira 2006; Harriott 2007a; Klein, 
Day, and Harriott 2004), which has decreased in recent years 
in this region with the shift of trafficking to the Central 
American corridor (UNODC 2007b). Drug flows aggravate 
crime and violence in a range of ways: First of all, they pro-
duce local drug use problems, thus resulting in secondary 
effects on domestic crime problems. Second, drug trans-
actions often involve firearms, and firearms are traded for 
drugs (Epps 2008). Third, movement of drugs nearly inevi-
tably leads to a certain corruption of local law enforcement 
officials. Fourth, the laundering of the revenues undermines 
legitimate economic activities. Other forms of organized 
crime affect the region as well. Among the most important 
are kidnapping, money laundering, and corruption.
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With regard to crime containment, clear priority is given to 
the law-and-order approach to the detriment of other ap-
proaches (such as integrated citizen security approaches or 
public health approaches) (Harriott 2000, 2003, 2006b, 
2006c, 2007a, 2007b, 2007c, 2007d, 2007e; Harriott, Braith-
waite, and Wortley 2004; Government of Jamaica 2004). 
Although there is no ideal approach, and measures against 
violence always need to be case specific, approaches that 
foster violence prevention can be more effective and 
cheaper. Reducing repressive “mano dura” programs in 
favor of expanding prevention would represent an effective 
strategy. Investigators point to the urgent need for more 
services to be offered to reintegrate deportees, and for gun 
ownership to be more strictly controlled, and suggest that 
evidence-based programs from other regions can be help-
ful to address youth violence.
2.4.4. Colombia
Colombia’s long experience with violence is broadly re-
flected in literature to this day (Arocha et al. 1998; Ballentine 
and Sherman 2003; Bergquist and Sánchez 1992; Boaventu-
ra de Sousa and García Villegas 2004; Bolivar, González, and 
Vazquez 2006; CEDE and UNIANDES 1997; Echandía 2006; 
Fals Borda, Guzman, and Umaña 2005; González, Bolívar, 
and Vásquez 2003; Montenegro and Posada 2001; Palacios 
2005; Palacios and Safford 2006; Pécaut 1987, 2001a, 2001b, 
2001d, 2001e, 2006a, 2006c; Perea 2009a, 2009b; Pizarro 
2004a, 2004b; Richani 2002; Rosales Ariza 2007; Rubio 
1998a, 1999; Ruiz 2001; Simons 2004; Uribe 2004; Wald-
mann 2007a, 2007b; World Bank 1999). For nearly sixty 
years, violence has been a crucial aspect of the public sphere. 
Since 1946, Colombia has been confronted with permanent 
armed conflict, starting with the “Violencia” from 1946 to 
1965 (Chacón Barrero 2004; Meertens and Sánchez 1983; 
Roldán 2002; Uribe 1990), a vicious undeclared civil war be-
tween liberal and conservative factions. Eric Hobsbawm 
(1994) considers “la Violencia” to be the strongest peasant 
mobilization of the twentieth century after the Mexican 
Revolution. In the end, the parties negotiated a peace agree-
ment that divided political power and distributed posts in 
the administration equally between the parties.
By the time the Colombian army defeated the last nucleus 
of resistance in the final stage of the “Violencia” in the 
mid-1960s, modern guerrilla groups were already rising 
(Braun 2003; Dudley 2006; Kurtenbach 1997; Pizarro 1996; 
Ramsey 2000; Villanueva Martínez 2007). Like many other 
Latin American nations, Colombia evolved as a highly 
segregated society, split between the traditionally rich 
families of Spanish descent and the vast majority of poor 
Colombians, many of whom are of mixed race. This group 
provided the natural constituency for left-wing insurgents 
who nowadays fall into two main groups, the bigger FARC 
(Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia), and the ELN 
(National Liberation Army) (Calvo 1987; Ferro and Uribe 
2003; García Durán, Grabe Loewenherz, and Patiño Hor-
maza 2008; Hickman 1983; Medina Gallego 2000; Pécaut 
2008a, 2008b, 2008c; Peñate 1998; Pizarro 1991). At the 
other end of the political spectrum are right-wing para-
militaries with roots in vigilante groups set up decades ago 
by landowners for protection against rebels (Davis and Per-
eira 2003; García-Peña 2005; Hristov 2009; Lair 2008; 
Medina 1990; Noreña Betancur 2007; Observatorio del 
Conflicto Armado 2007; Romero 2000a, 2000b, 2000c, 
2003a, 2003b, 2007a, 2007b; Rozema 2007). The main 
group was the AUC (United Self-Defense Forces of Colom-
bia). At the beginning of the 1980s, the paramilitary groups 
rose to become a third party in the conflict between the 
government and the left-wing guerillas, opposing any at-
tempt at negotiation, thus openly confronting the Colom-
bian state and challenging its weakened legitimacy 
(Gutiérrez Sanin 2005; Sánchez and Peñaranda 2007).
Over the years, elements of all armed groups have been 
involved in drug trafficking (Holmes 2003; Holmes, Gu-
tiérrez, and Curtin 2009; Pécaut 2000a, 2000b, 2000c, 
2001c). In a country where the presence of the state has 
always been weak, the result has been a grinding war on 
multiple front lines, with the civilian population caught 
in the crossfire and often deliberately targeted for “col-
laboration”. Human rights organizations blame para-
militaries for massacres, “disappearances”, and cases of 
torture and forced displacement. Rebel groups commit 
assassinations, kidnappings, and extortion. The state itself 
reacted brutally against both rebel groups and the popu-
lation in the affected areas, and sought support from the 
anti-drug campaigns of the United States (Amnesty Inter-
national 1994).
IJCV : Vol. 5 (1) 2011, pp. 87 – 154
Imbusch, Misse, and Carrión: Violence Research in Latin America and the Caribbean 110
Colombia has long had one of the highest per capita rates 
of homicide and kidnapping in Latin America. Homicides 
are related to political violence, to drugs, and to ordinary 
crime (Concha-Eastman 2002; Núñez Gómez 2004). Most 
kidnappings are for ransom and foreigners have long been 
potential targets. The most prominent case of kidnapping 
in recent years was that of French-Colombian Ingrid Be-
tancourt, who spent years in the hands of rebel groups. As-
saults and robberies have occurred after thieves have 
exposed travelers to incapacitating chemicals that cause 
unconsciousness. Travelling in rural zones outside the 
major cities involves a high risk of violence, kidnapping, or 
being caught in road blocks set up by illegal armed groups 
(Sánchez and Nuñez 2001; Sánchez 2003).
So obviously, violence in Colombia is a very complex phe-
nomenon. Over the years, a great deal of literature has been 
published, especially since the 1980s. Although many books 
and articles deal with the early phase of violence in Colom-
bia (“la violencia”) (Guzmán, Umaña, and Fals Borda 
1985), the bulk is about the second phase of violence, in-
cluding some very up-to-date reports (González, Bolívar, 
and Vázquez 2006; Peñarranda 2007).
What about the role of young people in this context of se-
vere violence? There are two main answers to this question. 
On the one side, we see the participation of young people 
recruited by illegal forces (guerilla groups, paramilitaries, 
drug cartels) or the Colombian army. Compulsory military 
service is a central issue with regard to the involvement of 
young people in the civil war. The Consejo de Estado re-
cently enacted a decree forbidding the involvement of non-
professional soldiers in combat. The recruitment of young 
men – often under 18 years of age – into the illegal armies 
is the other route to participation in the internal war. Al-
though this practice is condemned by human rights organ-
izations, there are no specific studies about the role of 
young people within the armed groups. On the other side, 
young people are involved in normal interpersonal viol-
ence and crime. While joining the different military, para-
military or guerilla forces was often beyond their control 
(Sierra de Arango and Rojas Moncriff 2005), involvement 
in violent crime is a behavior proper to unequal social 
structures, relative deprivation and individual choices. 
Many young people join urban gangs, which are present in 
all smaller and larger cities in Colombia. Recently, the issue 
of gangs experienced a brief boom but it is always over-
shadowed by interest in military actions undertaken by 
paramilitary forces or the state. Youth gangs are a sui gen-
eris phenomenon in Colombia; even in Medellín where 
armed actors had a major influence, youth gangs are re-
sponsible for most of the violence. In other cities, gangs are 
a central element of urban conflict. Despite the decisive 
role of young people in urban violence, there are few inves-
tigations about gang violence (Ardilla, Pombo, and Puerto 
1995; Bedoya and Jaramillo 1991; Fernández Menéndez 
and Ronquillo 2007; García 1998; Pérez and Meija 1996; 
Perea 2004a, 2004b, 2007, 2008b; Romero 2008a). Research 
has focused on the armed actors to the detriment of the 
study of other forms of violence.
Another prominent phenomenon of violence related spe-
cifically to young men is the “sicario”, which appeared in 
Colombia mainly between 1985 and 1995. Sicarios are pro-
fessional hit men or hired contract killers, adept at as-
sassination, kidnapping, bombing, and theft, who gradually 
became a class of their own in organized crime in Colom-
bia. Unlike their ancient forerunners, sicarios have never 
had an ideological underpinning. Perhaps the only cause 
they were dedicated to was opposition to the extradition of 
Colombian criminals. They were used by drug cartels to 
combat police and authorities and to eliminate enemies. 
Later on, these assassins acted more as independent indi-
viduals or gangs than loyal followers of a leader, and there 
were plenty of sicarios willing to serve the rival cartels. 
Many of them died in combat against police forces. Sicarios 
belong to the long history of professional kidnappers (“se-
cuestradores”) and murderers in Colombia (Salazar 1990; 
Salazar and Jaramillo 1992; Bedoya and Jaramillo 1991; Ja-
ramillo, Ceballos, and Villa 1998).
It is without doubt the strategic importance of organized 
armed violent groups and their capacity to destabilize the 
country that legitimizes the preponderance of studies on 
the armed actors. Today, at the beginning of the second de-
cade of the twenty-first century, finishing the internal war is 
a top priority in Colombia. The U.S.-backed government of 
Alvaro Uribe took a hard line on persecuting illegal violent 
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forces, and succeeded in improving security for the people, 
at least in the cities (Casas Dupuy 2005; Martin and Ceb-
allos 2004; Mockus and Acero 2005), but at tremendous so-
cial and economic costs (Gaviria et al. n.d.; Gaviria and 
Velez 2001). Despite the importance of political conflict, the 
number of deaths directly connected to the war is reduced 
in comparison to the total amount of the annual homicides, 
with politically motivated homicides amounting to only 25 
percent of total homicides in the country (Gómez 2003). 
But differences between regions and between urban and 
rural settings remain important. Medellín and Cali have 
long been the most violent cities in the world due to gueril-
la activities and the drug trade. During the 1990s, these 
cities accounted for 60 percent of national homicides but 
only 40 percent of the national population. In the first de-
cade of the new millennium urban homicide has decreased 
by roughly 40 percent, and violence is more present in rural 
areas where armed actors control many aspects of collective 
life, even applying their own justice systems.
2.4.5. Venezuela
Venezuela is among the most violent places in Latin Ameri-
ca today. Since Hugo Chávez became president violence 
and crime have risen tremendously. Critics accuse him of 
failing to make crime a priority. Class tensions, which are a 
central part of life in other South American countries, were 
for a long time papered over using oil wealth in Venezuela, 
but now armed robberies, carjacking, and kidnappings are 
frequent. Nearly ten thousand homicides were reported in 
2005 according to the latest government statistics. Experts 
argue that the real figure is much higher. Venezuela’s 
murder rate ranked third in Latin America in a recent re-
port from PAHO, behind Colombia and El Salvador. Crime 
rates are especially high in barrios and ranchitos (slum 
areas). Petty crime such as pick-pocketing is prevalent, par-
ticularly on public transport in Caracas.
The rapid increase in violence in the past two decades ap-
pears to be related to the collapse of the old political and 
social order and is also closely linked to certain violent 
events which represent turning points in the country’s re-
cent history (Briceño-León 2004, 2005, 2006; León 2010; 
Santos 1992). This is evident even on a cursory examin-
ation of the homicide rates published by LACSO (2004, 
2007). The murder rate in Venezuela was still relatively low 
throughout the 1980s. At approximately 8 per 100,000 resi-
dents it was higher than in countries like Costa Rica and 
the Southern Cone states, but far below the rates of Co-
lombia and Brazil. This period marks the final phase of the 
period of relative stability achieved through the “Pacto de 
Punto Fijo” in 1958 following the end of the dictatorship 
of Pérez Jímenez. The murder rate doubled between 1989 
and 1993. This rapid rise coincides with the 1989 “Caraca-
zo”, a popular uprising against price increases resulting 
from neo-liberal economic policies, and two attempted 
coups in the early 1990s. The murder rate then stagnated at 
this higher level until 1998. This period is characterized by 
relative political stability and an increase in the legitimacy 
of state institutions in the country. After 1999 there was an-
other steep jump in the murder rate, which reached hither-
to unknown levels. This new increase coincides with the 
rise to power of Hugo Chávez. Today, the national average 
is more than 50 murders per 100,000 residents (Avila and 
Briceño-León 2007; Briceño-León and Pérez 1999). The 
murder rate in Caracas, however, is triple that (Briceño-
León and Pérez 2002; Alcaldía de Chacao; Sanjuán 1997).
In addition to murders, the LACSO statistics (2007) also 
list “ejecuciones extrajudiciales” and indeterminate causes 
of death, most of which resulted from the use of weapons. 
The “extra-judicial executions” comprise killings by organ-
ized crime groups and acts of police brutality. This cat-
egory of violence, too, has seen a steep increase since 1999. 
While the number of cases of indeterminate cause of death 
tends to vary, it too has risen rapidly since 1998.
In addition to these three types of killings, a reasonably 
complete picture of the incidence of violence in Venezuela 
must also include the effects of ordinary violent crime 
(IESA 1997; Ugalde 1994). These include cases of organized 
crime, drug crime, auto theft, and at present also police 
brutality, which has at least partial support from the popu-
lation (Avila, Briceño-León, and Camardiel 2006). Ad-
ditionally, the frequency of kidnapping and armed 
extortion has increased sharply since 1998. However, the 
most frequent crimes in Venezuela are robbery without vi-
olence, robbery involving violence, and murder (in that 
order).
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Young people between the ages of 15 and 29 are most likely 
to become murder victims, followed by the 30–44 demo-
graphic cohort. Murder is the primary cause of death in 
these age groups, ranking far ahead of traffic accidents and 
certain diseases. The LACSO victimization survey (LACSO 
2007; CONAREPOL 2007) also discovered that only four 
out of ten victims of violence file a complaint. The main 
reasons for this are the failure of the police and the legal 
system to investigate such complaints; fear of reprisals 
from the police; and ignorance about where to go to report 
a crime. The number of crimes that go unpunished has 
been increasing for years, too. Of every one hundred cases 
of violent death reported, only seven are solved and only 
one perpetrator receives a sentence. Anxiety has increased 
significantly in the country’s major cities, and population 
surveys in recent years show that the fear of being mugged 
or becoming a victim of violence is significantly greater 
than the fear of unemployment.
However, the reasons for the steep increase in violence are 
relatively obscure, as the temporal coincidence of par-
ticular events with an increase in homicide rates cannot 
alone constitute a causal explanation (Briceño-León 1997; 
Ávila et al. 1997). At the structural level, however, it is ar-
gued that the transition from an affluent society to a crisis-
ridden one has not only greatly accelerated social change, 
but has also caused society to become poorer, more un-
stable, and more violent. It must also be noted that the 
neo-liberal economic reforms of the 1980s and 1990s vastly 
exacerbated the social problems and caused a sharp in-
crease in social inequality (León 2010). The long years in 
which mechanisms of social inclusion functioned relatively 
well have given way to overt processes of disintegration. 
Additionally, the repressive and violent responses of the 
state to the “Caracazo” and the attempted coups are seen as 
ruptures in the political compact and the symbolic order of 
democracy which not only brought about an institutional 
crisis, but also promoted crime and violence. Finally, the 
ambivalent attitude of the Chávez government towards 
curbing violence has been blamed for the increase in viol-
ent crime (Ferrándiz 2009). On the one hand, there is a 
certain amount of tolerance – up to and including permiss-
iveness – for certain crimes (“es comprensible que la gente 
robe si tiene necesidad”). On the other hand, the govern-
ment prosecutes several thousand “pre-delincuentes” every 
year despite the fact that the Venezuelan criminal law does 
not even know that category. Finally, it has been speculated 
that the government may be promoting violence by openly 
criticizing certain police measures (anti-violence cam-
paigns and campaigns against weapons) and by pointing 
out the usefulness of violence in certain situations (Brice-
ño-León and Pérez Perdomo 1999; Briceño-León 2005).
There are also a number of factors that facilitate or favor 
the use of violence, such as the increasingly easy availabil-
ity of weapons (pistols, revolvers, and automatic fire-
arms), excessive use of alcohol and drugs, and mental 
deficits and inadequate social competence in certain indi-
viduals. These latter factors are also repeatedly cited as 
causes of domestic violence, especially violence against 
women, which is a not inconsiderable factor in Venezuela 
(PNUD and AVESA 1999).
Until now, youth violence is not a specific topic in Vene-
zuela although the majority of perpetrators are adolescents 
and young men, the same demographic cohort that is 
identified by victimization surveys as the primary target 
group (LACSO 1996, 2007; Ávila et al. 1998). Another sub-
ject of debate is the situation of adolescents and street 
children, who are at least partially dependent on criminal 
activities for survival (Albano 2002; Márquez 2002).
2.4.6. Andean Region
For a long time, violence in the Andean region was as-
sociated with political violence (Basombrío 2006; Kurten-
bach, Minkner, and Steinauf 2004; Malloy and Gamarra 
1988; Thoumi 2003; Urbano 1991). The main reason for 
this was the chronic political instability in Ecuador, Peru, 
and Bolivia, where democracy and mechanisms of popular 
representation have always been poorly developed (Burt 
2004; Carrión 2007; Flores Galindo 1999; Mainwaring, Be-
jerano, and Pizarro 2006). Additionally, indigenous peoples 
still accounted for the majority population in these coun-
tries, and had been denied political and social rights for 
many decades. Even today, ethnic tensions are often super-
imposed upon social conflicts (Muñoz, Paredes, and Thorp 
2006; Roitman 2008; Thorp, Caumartin, and Gray Molina 
2006). These authoritarian regimes have never hesitated to 
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use violence against protest movements that began to 
threaten their rule (Lair and Sánchez 2004). These coun-
tries are also characterized by great socio-economic in-
equality, which has regularly given rise to political conflicts. 
In general, however, it must be said that involvement in dif-
ferent forms of violence has varied greatly from one 
country to another, and the same is true of the types of vi-
olence that have been addressed.
In Peru, political violence remains the central focus of in-
terest. In particular, the violence committed by the Maoist 
Sendero Luminoso guerrilla movement led by Abimael 
Gúzman and the extremely repressive response by the Fuji-
mori government have been the subject of numerous 
scientific studies (Burt 2007; Fumerton 2002; Klarén 2007; 
Manrique 2002; Montoya Rojas 1997). The reasons and 
background events that led to the formation of Sendero 
Luminoso in the 1980s in the highland region of Ayacucho 
have been investigated along with its merciless acts of viol-
ence and its goals and ideology, which at times so threaten-
ed the Peruvian government that its authority and 
legitimacy were openly called into question (Degregori 
1990; Palmer 1992; Stern 1998; Tarazona-Sevillano 1990; 
Taylor 2006). Another factor that has been studied is the 
far-reaching transformation of the Peruvian state as a re-
sult of the efforts to combat the guerrillas: In the course of 
the 1990s, Peru not only became an authoritarian state 
with dictatorial powers, but also allowed its own security 
forces to resort to terror tactics in combating the uprising 
and thus committed numerous grave violations of human 
rights (Burt 2006, 2009; Degregori et al. 1996; Jímenez 
2009; Ortega 2005; Tapia 1997). Neither Ecuador nor Boli-
via has a comparable record of political violence. Ecuador 
is the only country in the region in which anti-government 
protests by indigenous groups and organizations regularly 
involve violence, either committed by the protesters or ap-
plied in order to suppress the protests.
Like the rest of Latin America, the Andean region has ex-
perienced a sharp increase in everyday violence (Acosta 
1999; Andrade 1994; Goldstein 2004). The increase was lar-
gest in Peru, followed by Ecuador and Bolivia (INEI 1999; 
Instituto APOYO 1997). However, the data for this region is 
particularly poor and permits only very approximate con-
clusions about specific types of violence. Homicide rates in 
these countries are approximately average. Like elsewhere 
in Latin America, murder has become primarily an urban 
phenomenon in which young men account for the majority 
of perpetrators and victims alike. Murders and robberies 
are frequently committed by gangs (Argudo 1991; Cervino 
2004), which have been present for many years in Guaya-
quil and Lima and spread more recently to Quito, where 
their activities destabilize the security situation and severely 
affect urban life. The overwhelming majority of gang 
members are young people from the lower levels of society. 
Explanations for the popularity of gang membership range 
from the lack of social prospects through the desire for re-
cognition and identity in a social group to the simple in-
strumentality of criminal behavior. A few studies deal with 
the actual mechanics of socialization of adolescents in the 
gangs and with gangs as a specific subculture (Strocka 
2008; Muñar, Verhoeven, and Bernales 2004).
Gangs and armed groups are not, however, the only per-
petrators of violence. Other, less tightly organized groups 
and individuals are responsible for a wide variety of every-
day violence in all Latin American countries. Studies of 
these groups distinguish between different kinds of viol-
ence and examine the social backgrounds of the per-
petrators as well as the security measures implemented at 
various different levels (for example INEI 1999).
The rapid growth of interpersonal violence and the increase 
in all types of property crime has also brought the issue of 
public safety into sharper focus (Basombrío 2005; Borja 
Núñez 2004; Costa 2010a; Ojevedo Segovia 2006). In par-
ticular, researchers and authorities have grappled with the 
question of what to do about the high levels of urban inse-
curity and whether the police or the military should be ulti-
mately responsible for maintaining safety and public order 
(Pontón and Santillán 2008; Costa 2007, 2010b; Costa et al. 
2010). A special research unit on public safety established 
under Fernando Carrión at FLACSO in Quito has produced 
a number of publications on the security situation in Latin 
America. Its periodical, URVIO, began in 2006 to focus on 
security-related issues such as prisons, police reform, the 
judicial system, gangs, the role of the media, and possible 
prevention and intervention strategies. The research unit 
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also publishes the report “Ciudad Segura” at regular inter-
vals. These various publications always extend their focus to 
include security issues of general, trans-regional relevance 
and to provide comparative studies.
In recent years, the topic of domestic violence and violence 
against women and children has grown significantly within 
the broader category of interpersonal violence (CLADEM 
2004; Espinoza Matos 2000; Ramos Padilla 2006; Tórres 
Pinto and Mezza Rosso 2005; Tortosa 2003). Even if the 
difficulty of recording this type of violence and the high es-
timated number of unrecorded occurrences makes it im-
possible to do more than speculate about its true extent, it 
is undisputed that violence against women and children 
represents a grave social problem. Physical violence against 
women and children is a regular occurrence in over half 
the households in Peru and Bolivia. Additionally, ethnic 
stratification and its repercussions in these societies mean 
that even creating awareness of violence against women 
represents a particular challenge in its own right. For some 
time now, however, a few works have been available that 
provide an overview of the problem in the Andean region 
(CLADEM 2004). Some of them are published by govern-
ment ministries which are addressing the problem by 
means of prevention and intervention programs (for ex-
ample Ministerio de la Mujer y Desarrollo Social in Peru). 
Here, as everywhere, it is the typical forms of domestic vi-
olence – yelling, intimidation, threats, blows, beatings, con-
finement, and various forms of mistreatment and neglect – 
that are committed by male heads of households against 
women and children. One unequivocally positive devel-
opment is that violence against women and children is no 
longer considered a private matter or treated as an isolated 
phenomenon, but rather as a problem of the region’s 
socio-economic and cultural order and, at the very least, a 
public health problem.
2.4.7. Brazil
Violence is a widespread phenomenon in Brazil, which 
today holds an uncomfortable place at the top of the rank-
ing of the most violent countries in the world, with a 
national average of homicides close to 30 per 100,000 in-
habitants. Every year approximately 50,000 people are mur-
dered (World Bank 2006). But this picture is far from 
complete because it is part of a broader scenario of violence 
and crime that has emerged over recent decades (Rose 
2005; Misse 2006; Gawryszewski 2004; Sheper 1992; Sheriff 
2008). Therefore, crime and violence became central 
themes to reflect about Brazil and Brazilian society and is-
sues related to welfare, economy, public health, justice and 
governance in the country. With its dramatic numbers of 
homicides, especially in the largest cities, it is possible to say 
that crime, violence, and fear have become constitutive 
characteristics of the Brazilian urban centers, producing 
more fear, prejudice, and stigmas, and thus transforming 
everyday life and changing the social landscape of the cities.
During the past thirty years, after the successful transition 
from military dictatorship, Brazil witnessed a strengthen-
ing of the country’s democratic institutions and civil so-
ciety. The proliferation of nongovernmental organizations, 
growing institutionalized mechanisms, and spaces for par-
ticipation and popular demands are processes that, for all 
their faults and weaknesses, also characterize the con-
solidation of democracy in the country. However, frustrat-
ing any expectation that a democratic regime could have 
positive effects on “violence”, homicide rates and overall 
crime rates escalated dramatically during the same period 
(Caldeira and Holston 1999; Clark 2008; Gratius and John 
de Sousa 2007; Misse 2005; Peralva 2000; UFRJ and 
NECVU 2002). As a result, the increasing rates of crime ap-
pear as challenges to the democratic process, particularly 
when violence is understood as a matter of socioeconomic 
development.
Facing this reality, research on violence in Brazil has privi-
leged different perspectives that can be subsumed beneath 
various research topics such as structural, interpersonal, 
domestic, institutional, communitarian, or urban violence. 
These categories express the multidimensionality of the 
phenomenon, but also the difficulties of circumscribing it 
because there are a many intersections between the dif-
ferent forms of violence.
Undoubtedly, any reflection about violence in Brazil has to 
start from its centrality and how the phenomenon is re-
lated to the historical inequalities that characterize Brazi-
lian society (Arpini 2003; Caldeira 2001; Pandolfi 1999; 
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Richardson and Kirsten 2005; Rolnik 1999). Brazil is one of 
the countries with the greatest social inequality measured 
by Gini Index, and the gap between the wealthy and the 
poor is extreme. Brazil is second only to South Africa in the 
world ranking of income inequality. A huge proportion of 
the population lives in poverty, formerly in rural areas 
(Sant Ana and Rogerio 1998), today in urban settings. The 
combination of structural inequalities, disorganized ur-
banization processes, availability of firearms, and weak in-
stitutions, together with cultural aspects and a very 
particular democracy – capable of guaranteeing political 
but not social rights – are some of the elements key to 
understanding this scenario. The incidence of violent 
crime, including muggings, armed robberies, and sexual as-
sault, is high, particularly in Rio de Janeiro, Recife, and 
other large cities (Adorno, Cardia, and Poleto 2003a, 
2003b; Borges 2006; Cardia 2005a, 2005b; Pinheiro 1997; 
CEDEC 1996; de Lima 2009; Feghali, Mendes, Lemgruber 
2006; Pinheiro and Almeida 2003; Piquet Carneiro 2000). 
Carjacking is common in the major cities and criminals 
often use guns (Fernandez 2007; Peres 2004; Mesquita Neto 
2005; Tourinho Peres 2004). Gang-related violence is an 
important factor throughout the State of São Paulo and in 
the larger cities mainly in the south of the country (Ab-
ramovay et al. 1999a, 1999b; Adorno 1999; Coelho An-
drade 2007; Souza 1999; Zaluar 1994). Many young people 
live in juvenile subcultures that glorify the warrior ethos 
and the assertion of masculinity through the power ex-
pressed in threats based on the use of firearms. Crime le-
vels within slum areas are very high, and victims are often 
seriously injured or even killed when resisting perpetrators. 
During the peak tourist season, large organized criminal 
gangs have reportedly robbed and assaulted beachgoers. 
Express kidnapping, where individuals are abducted and 
forced to withdraw money from ATM machines to secure 
their release, are common in the major cities like Rio de Ja-
neiro, São Paulo, Brasilia, Salvador de Bahia, and Recife. 
Taking unregistered taxis is a further way to get robbed and 
assaulted. Petty crime such as pickpocketing and bag 
snatching is widespread and thieves operate in outdoor 
markets, on public transport, and in hotels.
The first studies on the theme in Brazil appeared during 
the first half of the 1970s dealing with juvenile delinquents 
in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo (Misse 1973; CEBRAP 
1973), and since the 1980s the topic of urban violence has 
been under serious discussion at the main universities in 
Brazil, to the point where violence today comprises a sig-
nificant part of Brazilian sociological and anthropological 
production (Misse 2000; Barreira and Adorno 2010). One 
of the most controversial issues since the 1980s has been 
the question of the drug trade and the social organization 
of urban crime in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo (Arias 
2006a, 2006b; Dowdney 2003; Misse 2010b, 2010c; Zaluar 
2001a, 2001b, 2004). Discussions have become polarized 
around the more or less organized nature of the retail drug 
market in shanty towns and slum areas in general, and the 
extra-legal extermination groups (milícias) maintained by 
businessmen to repress and kill armed robbers in their dis-
tricts. The drug trade is a well known problem in the major 
cities of Brazil and since groups are well organized they 
pose a major threat to social order and control. The grow-
ing recruitment of poor young people into drug-related or-
ganizations has also led to research on different aspects of 
primary and secondary socialization of youth (Zaluar 
2000a, 2000b, 2004). Recently, a new form of illegal terri-
torial control has emerged: The milícias are hybrid para-
military groups, made up of active or retired policemen 
and members of other emergency and security forces, such 
as firemen, prison officers, members of the armed forces, 
and private security guards. They became a parallel power 
controlling low-income communities in Rio de Janeiro. Al-
though they present themselves as dedicated to combating 
drug trafficking, their repertoire of action is not restricted 
to providing safety and order for the people living in the 
communities, but includes the control of other illegal ac-
tivities and services within the neighborhoods (charging 
residents for alternative transport, illegal sale of gas, etc.) 
(Zaluar 1996a, 1996b).
Researchers also identify significant changes in patterns of 
urban criminality since the mid-1970s. Controversy arose 
about how the breakdown of more civilized standards of 
behavior should be interpreted. One perspective describes 
the phenomenon by magnifying its criminal specificity, an-
other one by putting the criminal aspects into the broader 
dimensions of violence, pointing to the enormous social 
inequality in Brazil. The first pole stresses individual 
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choices, claiming that there is no correlation between 
urban poverty and crime. This group of researchers calls 
for more studies on penal impunity which they consider to 
be the factor most responsible for the growing violence. 
Discrimination against the Afro-Brazilian population and 
poor sectors of society by the police and the court system 
are also mentioned (Coelho 1980, 1987; Paixão 1995; Ador-
no 1998). In contrast to this perspective, others concentrate 
on the strategies used by poor youth to make their living 
through participation in illegal markets, and their modes 
of operating under conditions of social subordination with 
its intense accumulation of social disadvantages (Misse and 
Motta 1979; Zaluar 1985; Misse 1997, 2006). Studies point 
to a number of factors involved in these phenomena, espe-
cially the exhaustion of conventional models of social con-
trol (Adorno 1998), the inefficiency of the inquisitorial 
model of police and court action in Brazil (Kant de Lima 
1994), a crisis of social reciprocity (Velho 1996), a reversal 
of civilizational standards (Zaluar 1999), the deformation 
of individualism (Misse 2006, 2010a), and the emergence 
of violent socialization patterns (Machado da Silva 1999).
Institutional violence is another area of major concern in 
Brazil. Given the facts, it is no surprise that the work of the 
police and the violence perpetrated by police forces con-
stitute a specific and pioneering field of study in Brazil 
(Zaluar 1999). There is an extensive literature that shows 
how repression perpetrated by the state has been influential 
throughout Brazilian history, and that underprivileged 
groups are the main victims of abuse of power (Ramos and 
Musumeci 2005). One of the strategies of the state against 
crime is the excessive use of force by the police (Ahnen 
2007; Human Rights Watch 1997; Higgins, Flaritos-
Fatouris, and Zimbardo 2002). In many cities executions by 
police are part of everyday life (Cano 1997). It is estimated 
that police forces are responsible for 20 percent of criminal 
homicides in Rio de Janeiro. Furthermore, a relevant pro-
portion of police are involved in illegal schemes, drug 
trade, and arms trafficking. The great lethality of state re-
sponses to crime and the persistence of severe human 
rights violations, both targeting particular social groups, 
must be understood as a constitutive part of politics. These 
are subsidies to the reproduction of an extremely unequal 
society, responsible for democratic fragilities and the insuf-
ficient consolidation of citizenship. Police reform and con-
flict training for officers are other topics in this field of 
research. Furthermore, the establishment of women’s po-
lice stations (MacDowell Santos 2005) should make it ea-
sier for women to report violent aggression without danger 
of being mistreated by policemen.
If murder rates have grown significantly over the past three 
decades, it is necessary to point out this affects especially 
young people between 15 and 24 years old (Waiselfisz 
1998). The rise in homicides in Brazil is immediately re-
lated to the rise in murders of adolescents. If victimization 
by violence has an age, as many studies show, it has also a 
color: in the biggest Brazilian urban centers the young vic-
tims are mostly poor and black, living either on the out-
skirts of the cities or in the slums (Goldstein 2003; Saldaña 
Pereira and Rambla 2007; Wacquant 2003).
In recent years the literature on violence has begun ad-
dressing many new topics. Although youth was already ad-
dressed in a broad range of studies, the question of youth 
violence has become a research theme on its own and an 
object of intense intervention by organized civil society, be-
cause there is nothing inevitable about youth violence 
(Adorno 2002a, 2002b; Abramovay et al. 1999a). Two other 
important themes for researchers have been violence 
against women and violence in schools. A wealth of studies 
deals with the different forms of violence against women in 
the context of domestic violence and of sexual crimes and 
assaults (Guimares 2010; Taquette 2007). Another of the 
major issues studied by violence researchers is violence 
against children, especially street children (Gonçalves 2003; 
Hecht 1998; Mickelson 2000; Miraglia 2008a, 2008b; 
Moran and de Moura Castro 1997; Ribeiro and Trench 
Ciampone 2001; Rizzini 1994). Miriam Abramovay (2002, 
2005a, 2005b, 2005c) and others (Alli 2002) have con-
ducted extensive studies of violence in schools. Abramovay 
not only shows that schools can become violent in-
stitutions and that victimization represents part of the 
everyday experience of school students, but also points out 
the difficulty of ensuring conditions of socialization that 
delegitimize violence when the general environment is a vi-
olent one. Finally, given the enormous significance of viol-
ence in Brazil, other studies focus on the immense financial 
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costs (ISER 1998) and security questions and strategies 
(Adorno and Lamin 2006; Alvarez, Salla, and Souza 2004; 
Mesquita Neto 2008; Oliveira 2002).
2.4.8. The States of the Cono Sur
Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay are among the Latin Ameri-
can countries where violence rates are relatively low (WHO 
2002). This is attributed partly to the significantly higher 
level of development of these countries and partly to the 
different political culture that is dominant here. Never-
theless, violence has been a recurring subject of discussion 
in recent decades even in these countries: First while 
coming to terms with the extreme political violence of the 
past (during the military dictatorships of the 1970s and 
1980s), subsequently in debates about rising homicide rates 
and the increase in everyday violence (public safety dis-
courses), and finally in the context of violence by or against 
adolescents and children. While political violence has de-
creased sharply in these countries, there has been a con-
siderable increase in social violence.
For many years, public discourse in these countries focused 
primarily on the sometimes protracted periods of military 
dictatorship in their history. This focus is reflected not only 
in three reports by the Truth And Reconciliation Commis-
sions that investigated the violence and grievous human 
rights violations perpetrated by the military regimes (tor-
ture, disappearance, murder of dissenters, etc.), but also in 
a wealth of publications that deal with the backgrounds, 
origins, and peculiarities of the military regimes (Arocena 
1987; Burbach 2004; Feitlowitz 1998; Guissani 1991; Goi-
covic 2005; Lewis 2001; Marchak 2000; Rey Tristán 2006; 
Robin 2005; Wright 2007). Many of these highlight the ter-
ror tactics practiced by the governments, the traumatic 
consequences of the military regimes for society, and their 
destructive effects on the community (Osiel 2002; Robben 
2007; Straßner 2007). Given the after-effects of the military 
regimes, many authors view them as the triggers for pro-
cesses of social disintegration that subsequently culminated 
in violence (Cid Ferreira and Valle Cabrera 2006; Dammert 
2004b; Hojman 2002; Kaztman 1996). The economic po-
licies of the military regimes not only played a substantial 
role in exacerbating social inequality in these countries, but 
also cast their social structures into turmoil, and touched 
off far-reaching changes in them. This phenomenon, how-
ever, took different forms in each of the three countries 
(Rey Tristán 2007): While Chile was able to revert to its 
long tradition of political nonviolence after the collapse of 
the Pinochet dictatorship, and political violence has once 
again been completely delegitimized in Uruguay too, the 
situation in Argentina is very different. Not only does the 
country have a long history of political violence (Massot 
2003; Romero 2005; Vaccarezza 2010; Kaleck 2010; Larra-
quy 2010), but military posturing and social protests 
caused several uprisings in the period following the dicta-
torship. Additionally, the long period during which the per-
petrators went unpunished prompted repeated political 
protests in all three countries. The best-known and most 
far-reaching example of these protests are the “madres de 
la Plaza de Mayo” in Argentina.
Along with political violence, increasing levels of everyday 
violence represent another major issue in the Southern 
Cone states (Dammert and Oviedo2004; Kessler 2004; Le-
derman 1999; Spinelli 2005; Sperberg and Happe 2000). Al-
though homicide rates remain far below those of other 
Latin American countries such as Brazil, Colombia, and El 
Salvador, they have nevertheless doubled in the past two de-
cades. In particular, interpersonal violence and above all as-
sault, robbery, and burglaries have increased significantly in 
the larger cities and have caused considerable disquiet and 
insecurity among the population. For example, Lucía Dam-
mert (2000a, 2000b) notes that while violent crime has in-
creased throughout Argentina, the rise has been particularly 
steep in Buenos Aires. The majority of the crimes are prop-
erty crimes, mostly committed by young men between the 
ages of 16 and 25. In the case of Chile, Dammert points out 
that murder and homicide are not the only significant fac-
tors for creating feelings of insecurity, but that robberies, 
assault, and burglaries are of equal weight, and also that the 
probability of becoming a victim of such crimes is high. Al-
though reporting patterns for the different types of crimes 
vary considerably, there has been a marked increase in the 
reporting of all types since the end of the 1990s (Dammert 
2005). The literature reveals similar trends for Uruguay 
even though this country recorded the lowest increase in 
crime in the past decades (Paternain and Sanseviero 2008; 
Observatorio Nacional sobre Violencia y Criminalidad 
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2004, 2006). Violence is more prevalent in the major urban 
agglomerations than in rural areas. The highest increases 
were recorded for theft and armed robbery.
The primary reasons for the increases in violence are be-
lieved to be socio-economic factors and changes in the so-
cial structures that underpin the communities (the erosion 
of social cohesion patterns). Social fragmentation can be 
understood as a cultural and social process of dissolution 
of solidarities that causes sudden changes in social iden-
tities and the perceptions of the people. Social frag-
mentation leads to a fracturing or serious weakening of 
social relations marked by a pronounced increase in con-
flicts. Many investigators point out that the successive re-
gressive transformations of the social structures since the 
1980s resulted in a weakening of affective primary relations 
of kinship, an erosion of confidence and trust between 
citizens, and an undermining of social ties (Míguez and 
d’Angelo 2006; Isla and Míguez 2003). Although only pre-
liminary statistical analyses of such social relationships are 
currently available, various studies point out that while 
economic crises, social inequality, and unemployment are 
constitutive factors for explaining the increase in violence, 
poverty as such is less significant in this context. 
Interestingly, it is the safest countries of Latin America that 
have been the source of the intensive discourse about pub-
lic safety and order of recent years that has spread from 
here across the entire continent (Isla 2007; Dammert and 
Malone 2001, 2002, 2003, 2006; Dammert and Lunecke 
2002; Dammert, Karmy, and Manzano 2004; Saín 2007; 
Sozzo 2008). This is due not only to a real increase in viol-
ent crimes, but also to the fact that approximately 70 per-
cent of these crimes previously went unreported in 
Argentina and the average probability of a perpetrator 
being convicted was no higher than approximately 40 per-
cent. Prosecuting violent crimes within the judicial system 
is an extremely time-consuming process, and the work of 
both the police and the judicial system is ineffectual (Gayol 
and Kessler 2002), as reflected in the fact that two-thirds of 
the prison population have not yet received a final sen-
tence. Moreover, the Argentinian police itself is a consider-
able source of insecurity (Auyero 2007; CELS and Human 
Rights Watch 1998; Human Rights Watch 1991; Saín 2008). 
Almost 90 percent of the population say that they do not 
feel safe and are afraid of being attacked. In the case of 
Chile, confidence in the police and the judicial system is 
considerably higher than in Argentina, because these in-
stitutions (especially the Carabineros) are fairly dependable 
(for ongoing instances of police brutality, see Álvarez and 
Fuentes 2005). Nevertheless, a considerable proportion of 
the population feels insufficiently protected and is afraid of 
violent attacks. Almost 10 percent of households own fire-
arms for defense against possible attacks. Finally, numerous 
studies stress the high cost of violence for state and society 
(Gambi Olavarría and Contreras Villablanca 2005; Lira 
2000) and call for more effective prevention strategies 
(Guajardo García 2008).
Another increasingly important issue in the Southern Cone 
states, especially in Chile and Argentina, is violence per-
petrated by adolescents and children. The increasing in-
volvement of adolescents is presented in the mass media as 
a veritable “wave of youth violence” (Míguez 2004, 2008a; 
Blanco et al. 1999; del Felice 2006, 2008). And while it is 
true that arrests of adolescents have skyrocketed in recent 
years, one should not forget that adolescents are not only 
perpetrators, but also and primarily victims of violence. 
Studies of this issue show that adolescents and children are 
exposed to a variety of risk factors and that there is a high 
degree of intra-familial violence (Araujo, Guzmán, and 
Mauro 2000; Ciuca Díaz 2008; Falú and Segovia 2007; Ob-
servatorio de Equidad de Género 2008; SERNAM 2009; 
Traverso 2001; UNICEF 2000a, 2000b). Two-thirds of all 
children living in families suffer some form of violence 
while growing up (such as ill-treatment, beatings, etc.); 20 
percent of them are faced with psychological violence and 
30 percent are exposed to severe physical violence. Intra-
familial violence is also directed at women (Larraín 2008). 
A study by the Universidad de Chile (2001) has shown that 
up to 50 percent of women between the ages of 25 and 49 
suffer psychological repression, while roughly one-third ex-
perience physical violence and 15 percent sexual violence. 
A similar situation can be observed in schools (Kornblit 
2008; Míguez 2008b; Observatorio Argentino de Violencia 
en las Escuelas), where the most important strategy for as-
serting oneself in conflict situations is verbal or physical vi-
olence. In many schools crime is familiar. Over 50 percent 
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of school students report occurrences of theft and robbery 
in schools and state that they have taken drugs or alcohol 
on school premises at least once (INJ 2001).
The high overall level of violence in families and schools pro-
vides the perfect social breeding ground for violent behavior 
in adolescents. The probability of becoming violent later in 
life as a result of learning violence at an early age increases 
still more through the presence of youth-specific risk factors.
2.5. Causes and Determinants of Crime and Violence
The causes of violence and crime in Latin America and the 
Caribbean are diverse and complex. No single factor is able 
to adequately explain the high levels of violence. Therefore, 
the highly complex issue of possible causes can be analyzed 
from different perspectives, and the phenomenon should 
also be broken down in its component elements.
Generally speaking, we can easily identify a number of fac-
tors that are likely to have contributed to the increase in vi-
olent crime in Latin America since the transition from 
authoritarian rule to democracy. Some intrinsic factors and 
characteristics of each country may have aggravated the 
problem for certain countries. However, we can identify fac-
tors that increase the overall risk of crime and violence in 
most countries of the region: civil wars and armed conflicts 
with growing availability of firearms, high levels of in-
equality, low rates of economic growth and high un-
employment rates, urbanization and rapid growth of large 
cities, drug trafficking and organized crime, deficiencies of 
basic urban infrastructure and community organizations in 
the poorer neighborhoods, low levels of effectiveness of the 
police and other institutions of the criminal justice system, 
poor public education standards, etc. (Briceño-León 1997).
Although all these factors may be important to explain vi-
olence, they do not give us any indication of the relative 
importance of single factors and their explanatory power, 
their concrete importance for specific forms of violence, or 
the relation between root causes and additional factors. If 
we take a closer look at the concrete explanations for situ-
ations of violence, we find very different perspectives rang-
ing from criminological or economic to a social or public 
health point of view.
Criminologists, for example, consider factors as varied as 
age, gender, race, heredity, environment, family back-
ground, crime reduction policies and strategies, and econ-
omic indicators to explain the correlates and causes of 
violent crime. Many of them suggest that violent crime is a 
consequence of social and economic inequalities leading to 
different life chances between individuals. These studies 
find strong correlations between violent acts and social 
class: people living in lower-class areas have higher official 
crime rates. In an individualist rational perspective violent 
crime is economically motivated behavior and in cases of 
“successful” violent acts benefits exceed costs. Relative po-
verty is then recognized as the most obvious incentive for 
violent crime (Cerqueira and Lobão 2004).
To consider violence as a social or political phenomenon, 
we have to switch to a perspective taking into account so-
cietal factors and the macro-level. Sociologists and an-
thropologists, while conceding that social and economic 
conditions vary both within and among countries, point to 
a range of internal and external factors, which can com-
monly be associated with high levels of violence and delin-
quency involving many youth in the region. The 
impressively rapid urbanization process experienced by 
several countries, together with persistent poverty, in-
equality, political violence, the inadequacy of social ser-
vices, the consolidation of transnational crime 
organizations, the spread of drug use and drug trafficking, 
the disintegration of families and social networks, and the 
availability of weapons, are all considered and often cited 
as the main root causes of violence in the region. The 
highly complex and multifaceted problem of youth viol-
ence is often described by social researchers as a violent 
reaction to an unequal and unjust society, which seems to 
offer few opportunities for disadvantaged adolescents to 
break out of the vicious circle of poverty and exclusion 
(Berkman 2007; Briceño-León 1999; Concha-Eastman 
2000; Hagan and Peterson 1995; Koonings and Kruijt 2007, 
2009; Kruijt 2004; Levine and Rosich 1995; Moro 2006; 
Moser and Shrader 1998).
Economic perspectives on violence point to the violence-
related costs for individual and community and look for 
economic determinants of violence and crime in Latin 
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America. Crime and violence have traditionally been ana-
lyzed in terms of expected benefits vs. expected punish-
ment (or costs). Early works focused nearly exclusively on 
the incentives for potential criminals, concluding that the 
higher the return rates of criminal versus legal behaviors 
and the lower the probability of incarceration, the higher 
the individuals’ propensity to commit a crime. Fur-
thermore, empirical studies show that violence responds to 
changes in expected punishment, although the severity of 
sentences does not have a significant deterrent effect. More 
important seems to be the probability of being caught and 
tried (Buvinic, Morrison, and Orlando 2002). Other econ-
omic studies find that income inequality, not poverty or a 
low income as such, is a crucial determinant of crime, and 
that the greater the inequality, the higher the intentional 
homicide and robbery rates (Fajnzylber, Lederman, and 
Loayza 1998, 2000, 2002). It is estimated that a one percent 
rise in a country’s Gini coefficient is associated with a 
similar increase in its homicide rate (Newman 1999). GDP 
growth also has a positive impact on crime rates because 
employment possibilities rise. Intercontinental com-
parisons reveal that countries with a more unequal dis-
tribution of income tend to have higher crime rates then 
those with more egalitarian patterns of income dis-
tribution. Later studies differentiate that picture, taking 
into account other variables like education and schooling, 
and conclude that poverty and inequality combined with 
poor educational attainment or high levels of urban con-
centration are strong determinants of violence. Nowadays, 
the relationship between inequality and violence is not 
considered to be completely straightforward: Some coun-
tries have seen decreasing income inequality accompanied 
by an increase in violence, others a decrease in homicide 
rates accompanied by an increase in income inequality. 
The correlation is only strong for robbery, theft, etc. Today, 
inequality combined with feelings of social injustice is be-
lieved to generate violent conflict (Imbusch 2008b; Rubio 
1999). There is a widespread consensus in the literature 
that the explanation for the abnormally high levels of viol-
ence is primarily the extent of inequality rather than the 
overall levels of development in Latin America.
Experts from WHO and PAHO formulated a more complex 
model from a public health perspective that regards viol-
ence is an outcome of a complex interaction among many 
factors. They emphasize that violent behavior is learned and 
that it is affected by biological as well as environmental fac-
tors. The concrete relationship is captured in an “ecological 
model” that classifies risk factors for violence at four levels: 
individual, relationship, community, and society. Risk fac-
tors for violence are conditions that increase the likelihood 
of becoming a victim or a perpetrator of violence. This 
model seeks to distinguish systematically between the vari-
ous factors that affect individual, social, and collective viol-
ent behavior (WHO 2002; Moser and Shrader 1998).
Although some risk factors may be unique to particular 
types of violence, the various types generally share a 
number of risk factors. Concrete explanations of violent 
acts have to take into account the interaction of these fac-
tors on different levels. In the “ecological model” policies 
to reduce violence and crime should encompass sound 
macro-economic measures to generate quality employment 
and reduce income inequalities, as well as solid in-
stitutional reforms to improve the quality and accessibility 
of education.
One problem of these general explanatory models for 
high rates of violence in Latin America is that, although 
they identify important determinants of violence, they do 
not sufficiently assess the importance of individual vari-
ables for the present eruption of violence. For example, 
some of the more fundamental factors are perennial 
problems in the development of Latin American coun-
tries, while other factors cause problems only in some 
countries and not in others. Thus explanations for the 
sharp increase in violence in recent years must offer more 
specific arguments and must bring together different le-
vels of analysis.
Some researchers from Latin America therefore do not 
look any longer at general single factors to explain violence 
but argue that the recent rise in violence registered in Latin 
America originates from a complex set of factors. They em-
phasize that explanations of violence have to differentiate 
between different levels of contributing factors. Only this 
allows a multi-factorial approach whereby we can grasp 
both the particular aspects of the social structure of Latin 
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America and its cities and the dynamics of people’s be-
havior. Roberto Briceño-León (2002, 2005, 2008) presents 
such a sociological explanatory framework, pointing out 
that the social process leading to violence in Latin America 
is highly complex, and simplifications must be avoided be-
cause the goal is not to reduce the phenomenon’s multi-
faceted nature but to formulate scientific hypotheses to 
understand what is really going on when violence occurs. 
His proposal, developed at LACSO in Caracas, is a model 
not for universal explanations but for a concrete ex-
planation of the current violence in Latin America. The 
sociological framework has three dimensions, representing 
three distinct levels of explanation: The structural level 
refers to social processes of a macro-sociological nature 
that persist over a longer period of time. At this level, 
Briceño-León refers to background factors of violence. The 
second level contains meso-social aspects, thus represent-
ing the area where the situation and culture have more im-
mediate effects on behavior. At this level, he refers to 
factors that foment violence. The third level includes 
micro-social factors which he calls facilitators because they 
have a more individual nature and cannot be considered 
causes. At the macro-social level, Briceño-León identifies 
five types of factor: Increased urban inequality and in-
creased education in combination with increased un-
employment are two factors of situational nature. Two 
others are of a contingent nature, namely increased but un-
attainable aspirations, and changes in family structures. 
One factor is cultural, the decreasing capacity of the Cath-
olic Church to exert social control. Factors that foment vi-
olence can be found at the meso-social level. They refer to 
specific situations that increase violence by fomenting a 
type of exacerbating behavior: Of the three factors at this 
level two are situational, namely urban segregation, pro-
ducing divided cities, and the local drug market; one is of a 
cultural nature, namely the cult of masculinity. At the third 
level we find factors that are not the origin of violence but 
which facilitate violent behavior or make it more damaging 
and more lethal, because it enables and stimulates such a 
behavior. The availability and possession of firearms 
among the population, alcohol consumption, and the in-
ability to express feelings verbally are the three factors on 
the individual level that contribute to the rise of violence. 
These factors not only contribute to the breakdown of 
Level
Individual
(biological and person-
al history factors that 
influence how individ-
uals behave)
Relationship
(with family members, 
friends, intimate 
partners, peers)
Community
(neighborhood, school, 
workplace)
Societal
(broad factors that re-
duce inhibitions 
against violence)
Source: WHO (2002)
Risk factors
• Early developmental experience
• Demographic characteristics (age, education, 
family, personal income)
• Victim of child abuse and neglect
• Psychological and personality disorders
• Physical health and disabilities
• Alcohol or substance abuse problems
• History of violent behavior
• Youth
• Male
• Gun ownership
• Marital conflicts around gender roles and re-
sources
• Association with friends who engage in violent or 
delinquent behavior
• Poor parenting practices
• Parental conflict involving the use of violence
• Low socioeconomic status of household
• High residential mobility
• High unemployment
• High population density
• Social isolation
• Proximity to drug trade
• Inadequate victim care services
• Poverty
• Weak policies and programs in workplaces, 
schools, residential care facilities
• Rapid social change
• Economic inequality
• Gender inequality
• Policies that create and sustain or increase 
economic and social inequalities
• Norms that give parents’ rights over child welfare
• Norms that entrench male dominance over 
women
• Poverty
• Weak economic safety nets
• Poor rule of law
• Poor criminal justice system
• Social or cultural norms that support violence
• Availability of means (weapons, firearms, etc.)
• Conflict or post-conflict situations
Table 2: The ecological model of violence
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urban life but are also a serious threat to citizenship in 
Latin America (Weyland 2003).
Some researchers identify factors that contribute to the 
legitimization of violence (Apter 1997). They mention a 
country’s level of impunity and corruption, racism, per-
ceived lack of justice, and its links to social exclusion 
(Moser and van Bronkhorst 1999). The state’s lack of ca-
pacity to effectively protect its citizens has a lot to do 
with the aforementioned policing problems and the 
problematic resort to military force to uphold public 
order, but also with the effectiveness of the judiciary and 
the deficits of the criminal justice system. The judicial 
systems of many Latin American countries are highly in-
efficient and arbitrary. Access to justice is especially prob-
lematic for the poor and for socially excluded minorities. 
The high levels of impunity are seen as a key reason for 
the high levels of violence in Latin America (Ayres 1998). 
Although black people and ethnic minorities won im-
portant rights during recent years making them equal 
citizens of their states, discrimination and racism occur 
in all these countries, leading to harsher punishment for 
minority groups while members of the socioeconomic 
elites are often treated with velvet gloves. The perceived 
lack of justice where perpetrators are well known in a 
barrio leads to self-justice that sometimes provokes spir-
als of violence.
2.6. The Social Costs and Consequences of Violence and Crime
Violence and crime are among the key obstacles to devel-
opment in Latin America (Ayres 1998; Londoño, Gaviria, 
and Guerrero 2000). Violence constantly undermines de-
velopment efforts at various levels and leads to the de-
preciation of all forms of capital, physical, human, and 
social. This is even more dramatic if we remember some 
important facts about violence: Violence dispropor-
tionately affects the poor and erodes their livelihoods and 
assets. Children and youth are heavily affected by viol-
ence, since childhood and adolescence are critical stages 
of personal development and for the accumulation of 
these assets. The fewer assets an individual has, the more 
likely they are to turn to alternative means of survival, in-
cluding violence. Therefore, one way to measure the con-
sequences of violence and crime is to look at the asset 
vulnerability of violence (Moser and van Bronkhorst 
1999; Heinemann and Verner 2006). That means that vi-
olence erodes
• labor when it limits access to jobs,
• human capital when it limits access to education and 
health facilities,
• social capital when it reduces trust and cooperation be-
tween community members and community-level social 
organizations,
• household relations when it limits the capacity to func-
tion effectively as a unit,
• productive assets when it destroys factories and housing.
The effect violence has had on the accumulation of human 
capital is staggering: Londoño (1998) estimates that the net 
accumulation of human capital in Latin America and the 
Caribbean has been cut in half due to the increase in crime 
and violence since 1980 (IDB Technical Note 4).
Another way of conceptualizing the effects of crime and vi-
olence on development, rather than focusing on individual 
or household assets, is to discern the direct and indirect 
impact of violence on society and economy and thus esti-
mate these as costs (for example for policing, for health 
services, etc.). Although not all expenditures can be re-
garded as costs of violence, since there is always a need for 
some basic level of police, judicial, and health spending, 
even in the absence of violence, the assumption is that high 
incidences of violence will divert government resources 
from other, presumably more productive purposes. Thus, 
the magnitude of the problem can be expressed in monet-
ary terms, differentiating between direct monetary costs, 
indirect (non-monetary) costs, and economic and social 
multiplier effects.
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fected by violence and crime. But even in cases where the 
magnitude of violence was smaller, direct costs are con-
siderable: 6.9 percent for Venezuela (Navarro 1999), 4.9 
percent for Mexico (Lozano et al. 2000), 3.3 percent for 
Brazil, and 2.9 for Peru (Couttolene, Cano, Carneiro and 
Phebo 2000; Eyzaguierre 2000). The costs increase con-
siderably if we include the indirect costs: Then, the total 
costs of violence are estimated to represent some 24.9 per-
cent of GDP in El Salvador, 24 percent in Colombia, 12.3 
percent in Mexico, 11.8 percent in Venezuela, 10.5 percent 
in Brazil, and 5.1 percent in Peru (Briceño-León 2002). The 
total economic cost of violence for the city of Rio de Janei-
ro in 1993 was estimated at $1 billion (Moser and van 
Bronkhorst 1999).
It is estimated that countries in Latin America devote be-
tween 0.3 and 5 percent of GDP to treat the health con-
sequences of violence and spend between 2 and 9 percent 
of GDP to provide judicial and police services. In Colom-
bia, public spending on security and criminal justice was 
estimated at 5 percent of GDP in 1996, private ex-
penditures on security amounted for another 1.4 percent 
of GDP. In a separate study, the Colombian National Plan-
ning Department estimated the costs of urban violence and 
armed conflict at 18.5 percent of GDP between 1991 and 
1996. In Venezuela direct costs of violence are estimated to 
be 9 percent of GDP in terms of health and material losses 
in 1997 (Buvinic and Morrison 2000; Buvinic, Morrison, 
and Shifter 1999; Buvinic, Morrison, and Orlando 2002; 
Gaviria, Guerrero and Londoño 2000).
In 2004, the WHO published an international study on 
the economic dimensions of interpersonal violence. The 
overview of costs included such different categories as 
child abuse and neglect, intimate partner violence, sexual 
violence, workplace violence, youth violence, guns, 
drugs, and gangs but supplied little data for the Latin 
American countries. Calculations of the costs of do-
mestic violence against women reveal that the lost pro-
ductive capacity of the women totals $1.73 billion in 
Chile and $32.7 million in Nicaragua. Direct medical 
costs plus lost productivity are equivalent to 2 percent of 
GDP in Chile and 1.6 percent of GDP in Nicaragua 
(WHO 2004).
Table 3: A typology of socioeconomic costs of violence
Direct monetary costs, i.e. the value 
of goods and services used in treat-
ing or preventing violence
• police costs
• diverse costs of criminal justice 
systems
• costs for perpetrator control or in-
carceration
• medical costs
• costs for psychological counseling
• damage to physical infrastructure
• costs for social services
• private security contracts
• life insurance costs
Economic multiplier effects, i.e. mac-
roeconomic, labor market, and inter-
generational productivity effects
• decreased labor market par-
ticipation
• reduced work productivity 
• lower earnings
• increased absenteeism
• intergenerational productivity im-
pacts
• decreased investments and savings
• capital flight
• decreased government revenues
• decreased tourism
• impact on policy-making
Sources: Morrison, Buvinic, and Shifter (2003); WHO (2004).
Indirect, non-monetary, costs, i.e. 
pain and suffering associated with 
 violence and crime
• increased morbidity
• increased mortality via homicide 
and suicide
• abuse of alcohol and drugs
• depressive disorders
Social multiplier effects, i.e. the 
impact on interpersonal relations 
and quality of life
• intergenerational transmission 
of violence
• erosion of human capital
• erosion of social capital and the 
social fabric
• reduced quality of life
• erosion of state’s credibility
• reduced participation in demo-
cratic processes
Studies documenting the socioeconomic effects of (inter-
personal) violence differentiate a broad range of categories 
of costs. Estimates of these costs vary widely and dif-
ferences mainly result from the inclusion or exclusion of 
different categories, or the different time spans covered by 
the studies. Due to different methodologies, figures from 
the studies are not strictly comparable with one another 
and are only intended to provide an indication of mag-
nitudes.
The direct economic costs of violence in Colombia repre-
sent 11.4 percent of GDP and in El Salvador 6.9 percent 
(Rubio 2000; Cruz, Romano, González and Sistí 2000). In 
recent years, these two countries have been the worst af-
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In addition to the direct costs, crime and violence have sig-
nificant multiplier effects on the economy and society by 
depressing savings, investments, earnings, productivity, 
labor market participation, tourism, and ultimately 
growth. A study on Colombia suggests that for every ad-
ditional 10 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants, the level of 
investment falls approximately 4 percent (Buvinic and 
Morrison 2000). That means if homicide rates had re-
mained unchanged since the 1960s, total annual invest-
ment in Colombia would be 20 percent higher. Another 
study on Colombia by Rubio (1996) concludes that with-
out the cumulative effects of lost growth as a result of 
crime and violence the country’s per capita income would 
be about 32 percent higher. The reduction in average an-
nual growth was estimated at 2 percent through the decade 
of the 1990s (Schneidman 1996; Heinemann and Verner 
2006; Solimano 2004).
Although the social multiplier effects are less easily to 
quantify, the impact of violence on interpersonal relations 
and quality of life is not to be underestimated. Processes in 
this field include the intergenerational transmission of vi-
olence, erosion of social capital, reduced quality of life, and 
diminished participation in democracy. As the historical 
experience of most Latin American countries shows, 
(political) violence may have an important function in 
terms of catalyzing political and social change. When effi-
cient institutional channels for peaceful democratic par-
ticipation are nonexistent, violence may be a necessary 
means of initiating political and social change. On the 
other side, violence has been used again and again by 
political, economic, and military elites to stop social change 
and suppress the people. Unlike political violence, inter-
personal violence does not have such simple effects on so-
cial change and democracy. A high incidence of violence, 
however, challenges the state’s monopoly of force and its 
responsibility to protect its citizens. In Latin America, the 
promise of reduced state violence has not always materi-
alized and often democratization has been accompanied by 
a continuation or even an increase in the use of force by 
the police or the military. Therefore, political regimes in 
the region have been described as “uncivil democracies” 
characterized by a weak democratic culture. After auth-
oritarian rule, the political right to vote has been achieved 
everywhere, but demands for stronger social participation 
and a democratic culture of conflict have been blocked by 
elites. Social cohesion generally weakened during the last 
decades and crime and violence have had devastating ef-
fects on social capital, thus fuelling the ongoing erosion of 
interpersonal trust and the norms of reciprocity (ECLAC 
2007; Lederman, Menéndez, and Loayza 2002). A World 
Bank study on Jamaica concludes that one of the clearest 
impacts of violence in communities is social frag-
mentation. Crime and violence have adverse effects on the 
ability of community members to associate with one an-
other. In many areas, recreation centers, dance halls, youth 
clubs, and sports facilities no longer function because of 
crime and violence. Crime and violence make it increas-
ingly difficult for any sort of community organizations not 
based on fear and coercion to function (World Bank 1996). 
Recent studies on urban security not only reveal that gen-
eralized feelings of fear are widespread among Latin 
American citizens but argue that the political impact of so-
cial violence is very strong within a regional context char-
acterized by a weak democratic culture (Frühling and 
Tulchin 2003; Heinemann and Verner 2006).
2.7. Strategies against Violence
As the causes of the various forms of violence in Latin 
America are complex, strategies for combating violence too 
must be nuanced and varied. It is self-evident that ap-
propriate strategies must be directed at the causes and/or 
attendant circumstances of violence rather than attempting 
to provide quick fixes for superficial phenomena. Some 
causes, moreover, are considerably easier to combat than 
others. Political violence, for example, cannot be success-
fully countered in the short term but must be addressed on 
a medium- to long-term basis through comprehensive de-
mocratization processes, by entrenching the rule of law and 
human rights, and by enabling social participation. Simil-
arly, the extreme social differences between individual 
groups, strata, and classes and the social injustice which is 
repeatedly cited as the most important underlying factor 
for the high levels of violence cannot be remedied in the 
short or medium term. However, countries in Latin Ameri-
ca find themselves faced with the need to deal with the un-
bridled violence in some way and, at the very least, to 
contain it.
IJCV : Vol. 5 (1) 2011, pp. 87 – 154
Imbusch, Misse, and Carrión: Violence Research in Latin America and the Caribbean 125
Different societies in Latin America have pursued very dif-
ferent intervention strategies. At times they have employed 
preventative measures, at other times interventions were 
staged to achieve greater social control, or repressive stra-
tegies were employed to contain outbreaks of uncontrolled 
violence. Even though there is widespread agreement about 
the need for preventive measures to deal with violence, and 
even though integrative programs are generally given pref-
erence (Arias and Dammert 2007; Basombrío 2010; CDC 
2001; Rodríguez 2000, 2005a, 2005b, 2006; Valle 2006; Van-
derschueren 2004a, 2004b, 2008), the reality is that pre-
ventive measures in the true sense have generally been 
implemented only in post-conflict situations and that stra-
tegies of social control have been employed with greater 
frequency. In contrast, strategies of repression by the police 
and the military have invariably been used when the task 
was to combat violence or crime directly and to arrest cri-
minals or perpetrators of violence. Because of frequent 
deficits in the professionalism of the security forces, pure 
strategies of repression have proved to be either inadequate 
or highly excessive (Arriagada and Godoy 2000; Carranza 
2003, 2004; Greene and Pranis 2007) and have frequently 
involved a high risk of escalation.
It is important to note that the bulk of the literature on in-
tervention strategies for violence has been developed in 
high-income countries or by scholars working in inter-
national organizations. Despite this, the evidence base for 
violence prevention is expanding rapidly (Banco Mundial 
2003; Chinchilla and Rico 1997; Dahlberg and Butchart 
2005; Moser and McIlwaine 2006; Moser and Shrader 1999; 
UNICEF 2001, 2003; World Bank 2010b). Gaps remain in 
relation to effective strategies for reducing interpersonal vi-
olence (Willman and Makisaka 2010). The greatest strides 
have come in the areas of youth violence, domestic viol-
ence, and child abuse. The many commonalities among the 
various forms of violence in relation to their epidemiology 
and etiology suggest that there are common pathways to 
prevention. International organizations like WHO and 
PAHO have developed prevention strategies to identify the 
most important factors that might be incorporated into ef-
fective violence intervention plans. They are based on two 
key dimensions: the stages of human development and the 
ecological model mentioned earlier.
Violence has a lot to do with human development because 
it is generally considered to be a kind of learned behavior. 
Such learning takes place at different developmental stages 
so intervening at early stages may reduce the likelihood that 
violence is expressed later on. The ecological model is an 
important dimension of the typology, because violence is 
the product of multiple and overlapping levels of influence 
on behavior. The model assumes that violent behavior is 
influenced by social contexts and the individual attributes 
brought to these contexts. Therefore, intervention strategies 
may attempt to influence aspects of risk factors at any or all 
of the model’s four levels (individual, relationship, commu-
nity, society). Furthermore, intervention strategies have to 
reflect different development stages and thus promote a 
differentiated program of interventions.
But a simple or mechanistic understanding of the ap-
proaches is insufficient. Preventive interventions are typi-
cally classified in terms of three levels: primary, secondary, 
and tertiary. Primary interventions focus on preventing vi-
olence before it occurs. They are targeted towards reducing 
risk factors and increasing protection factors among 
broader population groups. Primary prevention strategies 
include such different aspects as influencing the cultural 
context and cultural traditions that justify violent practices, 
or restricting access to lethal means, such as firearms, and 
limiting the time and space where firearms can be carried, 
or running mentoring programs to improve parenting, or 
reducing income inequality to close the gap between ex-
treme poverty and extreme wealth. Although emphasis on 
primary prevention is essential for reducing the burden as-
sociated with violence, secondary prevention programs are 
necessary for addressing the immediate consequences of vi-
olent actions and behaviors, while tertiary programs focus 
on long-term care. Secondary prevention focuses on groups 
that have a high risk of exhibiting or developing violent be-
havior (such as economically and socially disadvantaged 
youth). Tertiary prevention is geared towards individuals 
that have exhibited or been victims of violent behavior in 
order to avoid repeat offenses or prevent re-victimization.
Because of its multiple causes and consequences, address-
ing violence requires implementing measures in several 
different sectors of society. It is evident that no single for-
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mula can be applied to all situations of violence but there 
are specific violence prevention actions for:
• the education sector, for example teaching conflict resol-
ution skills, creating non-sexist school curricula, carrying 
out cognitive interventions, improving the school cli-
mate, reducing drop out rates, and improving oppor-
tunities to enter labor markets, etc;
• health, for example providing access to reproductive 
health care, improving detection of victims of violence, 
conducting home visits to low income mothers, creating 
alcohol and drug abuse programs, etc.;
• justice, for example creating alternative dispute resol-
ution centers, incorporating violence prevention ac-
tivities into judicial reform projects, measures to control 
the availability of guns, reducing levels of impunity, pro-
viding training on domestic violence for judicial person-
nel, etc.;
• the police, for example implementing community polic-
ing, providing police training, increasing cooperation 
with agencies of civil society, solving and prosecuting 
more cases in order to reduce impunity, etc.;
• the social service sector, for example conducting conflict 
resolution workshops for couples, providing social skills 
training, organizing mentoring programs for high risk 
teens, etc.;
• the media, for example mounting information campaigns 
to change norms regarding violence, reducing violence in 
TV programs, providing training for journalists on how 
to report on crime, etc.;
• housing and urban development; for example incor-
porating security issues in housing construction pro-
grams, building sports and recreation facilities, facilities 
for neighborhood organizations, etc.;
• civil society in general, for example generating private 
sector support for violence prevention initiatives, im-
plementing programs for at-risk youth, involving the 
church and other community groups in efforts to change 
prevailing attitudes and socially accepting norms regard-
ing violence, etc. (IDB Technical Note 5)
Studies show that implementing preventive interventions 
costs less than dealing with the outcomes of violence, in 
some cases by several orders of magnitude (Rosenberg 
1991). Although most evaluations of prevention programs 
measure costs and effects in high income countries, there is 
some positive evidence from Latin America too, for ex-
ample the 1995–97 Civic Culture Program of Antanas 
Mockus, then the mayor of Bogotá (Mockus 1999). Pre-
ventive measures do not, however, invariably have so ex-
plicit a programmatic character; rather, individual measures 
for containing violence are often embedded in programs 
that serve a very different purpose. Thus it is impossible to 
measure the exact weight, scope, and success of explicit pre-
vention strategies, though the relevant literature does not 
question their fundamental significance and desirability.
Control strategies as intervention measures range between 
the poles of preventive and repressive and may take the 
form of public surveillance, control of situative dangers 
and risk factors, or control over certain groups or segments 
of the population, all with the aim of achieving or im-
proving security. Control strategies may be direct or indi-
rect. Direct strategies are aimed at potentially violent 
situations or groups of perpetrators, while indirect stra-
tegies serve to control the environments of possible per-
petrators (potentially violent settings, family backgrounds, 
certain urban social spaces). Another distinction that is 
commonly made is between formal and informal control. 
Formal control is exerted by state bodies, while informal 
control is brought to bear by society. The surveillance and 
control of urban spaces takes a variety of different forms in 
Latin America. The police may patrol the streets or be post-
ed in strategic places such as important buildings and in-
tersections. Private security firms and guards are 
ubiquitous in the larger cities as protection against thieves 
and attackers for stores and homes. Many suburbs are 
monitored by vigilante groups, while others take the form 
of gated communities entirely inaccessible to the mass of 
the population. Video surveillance for large properties and 
buildings, like the erection of explicit boundaries (high 
walls or fences) and other barriers (such as window bars) 
has become standard procedure in many places. These are 
not confined to affluent and middle-class areas, but may be 
frequently found in poorer areas as well. Safety and secur-
ity issues climbed back to the top of the social agenda some 
time ago, and they are evidently of keen interest to all strata 
and groups in society. The prominence of security issues 
indicates, above all, the fundamental failure of the state to 
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provide effective protection for its citizens. It also high-
lights the state’s desperate attempts to extend its fragile 
monopoly on violence to contexts where the state is more 
or less absent and to regain control over national territory.
Today, control strategies have greater importance than pre-
ventive measures in almost every country in Latin America. 
This is partly because preventive measures, while effective 
in the medium and long term, rarely have a positive impact 
in the short term. The severe loss of influence of traditional 
sources of authority such as families, schools, and the 
Catholic Church has led to a renewed quest for suitable 
and situatively adequate methods of control in the context 
of a perceived weakening of mechanisms of social cohe-
sion. Increasingly, too, control is taken to mean surveillance 
of situations and events, localities and groups, in order to 
detect and prevent violent acts at an early stage.
Preventive and controlling interventions may be aimed at 
either direct or indirect containment of violence. They are, 
however, not the only two options for addressing the prob-
lem. A third, and key, strategy has always been that of re-
pression. Repressive measures are generally brought to bear 
by state institutions on criminals and perpetrators of viol-
ence. Governments resort to various ways and means of 
suppressing or containing violence. They may issue laws 
and regulations declaring the use of violence to be illegit-
imate and may punish violent acts depending on their se-
verity – in other words, they may penalize deviant 
behavior. When faced with continuing violence or extra-
ordinary violent events, they may threaten to tighten the 
laws and raise the penalties as a deterrent to potential per-
petrators. Depending on the severity of the crimes and the 
prevalent types of violence, many developing countries de-
ploy not only the police, but also the military or para-
military police units to preserve order and ensure security. 
State security forces then take action against undesirable 
demonstrations and illegal gatherings, stamping out hot-
spots that represent sources of repeated violence. In using 
repressive methods more frequently than preventive stra-
tegies to combat gang crime and youth gangs, the security 
forces rarely help to decriminalize youth gangs and youth 
violence. While they did succeed in the case of Nicaragua, 
they frequently contribute instead to the explicit criminal-
ization of youth gangs and violence and thus to the streng-
thening of cohesion among the gang members, and 
ultimately, as in El Salvador, to an increase in violence. The 
severe crackdowns on youth gangs that form part of the 
policy of “mano dura” in some Central American coun-
tries have proved particularly unlikely to succeed.
It should be borne in mind that the police forces of many 
countries on the subcontinent are violent actors not only in 
the sense of a state monopoly on violence that is perceived 
as legitimate. Their lack of professionalism, low pay, cor-
ruption, and willingness to employ young men with a pre-
disposition to violence also mean that the police forces 
themselves represent a threat to the population. However, 
the frequent failure of strategies for suppressing violence is 
due not only to the spirals of violence and counter-violence 
that result from these conditions, but also to the fact that the 
state monopoly on violence in many Latin American coun-
tries is porous and governments are unable to enforce it 
throughout their territories. Areas which are de facto outside 
state control are then taken over by parastatal organizations 
of dubious legitimacy or by local and regional “strongmen” 
who enforce order and security in their own ways.
Another way in which purely repressive strategies are 
counterproductive is that adolescents and young adults fre-
quently receive severe sentences for comparatively petty 
crimes. The brutalization of these juvenile delinquents sub-
sequently proceeds at a faster pace in prison, where they not 
only become victims of violence themselves but also learn 
to use violence as a means for asserting their own interests, 
and sometimes even for sheer survival. While in prison they 
also come into contact with criminal environments and be-
come socially isolated while serving sentences of several 
years. Thus the groundwork is laid for their future careers 
in violence, and the occurrence of renewed outbreaks of vi-
olence is only a matter of time and circumstance.
To sum up, we can state that crime and violence in Latin 
America and the Caribbean can be more effectively pre-
vented and reduced by:
• improving the data to give us a better understanding of 
the nature and extent of violence in the region,
• reducing social inequality and urban poverty,
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• targeting programs on vulnerable groups, especially at-
risk adolescents and women,
• building (or rebuilding) social capital,
• putting forward comprehensive programs to deal with 
youth and gang violence,
• strengthening the capacities of local governments to 
combat crime and violence through community involve-
ment and partnerships with civil society and the private 
sector,
• reforming the criminal justice systems and pro-
fessionalizing the forces of public order (Ayres 1998; 
Cohen and Rubio 2007).
3. Youth and Violence
Since the 1990s, the issue of “youth violence” has devel-
oped into one of the major topics on the political and so-
cial agenda of most Latin American countries (McAlister 
2000). As the preceding chapters have shown, violence has 
not only increased significantly in most countries in the re-
gion over the past two decades, but has also turned into a 
phenomenon that affects youth. For one thing, a large pro-
portion of the delinquents involved in crimes and violent 
acts are young people. Similarly, most of the victims of vi-
olent acts are young people between the ages of 14 and 29 
(Imbusch 2008a, 2009). Another reason for the increasing 
focus on young people may be that young people fre-
quently seek public attention and that their provocative 
conduct is widely visible, which typically leads to increased 
media attention and more time for the issue in the news 
media. Finally, a developmental argument may carry con-
siderable weight: If young people who are still in a critical 
phase of their socialization lapse into violence and criminal 
behavior, in other words, if they are socialized through vi-
olence – or, worse still, into violence – then these experi-
ences will have lasting knock-on effects in their later lives. 
At this phase in their lives, young people learn behavior 
patterns which cannot be unlearned later in life without 
greater or lesser difficulty (depending on situation and so-
cial status).
Since young people form a large proportion of the popu-
lation in most developing countries (where they sometimes 
represent the largest single population group), it is unsur-
prising that many international organizations pay close at-
tention to the situation of young people in these countries 
(WHO 2002, 2004; World Bank 2005, 2007; World Youth 
Report 2003, 2005, 2007; UNICEF 2006). According to the 
definition used by WHO, UNICEF, and UNFPA, the term 
“adolescents” refers to persons aged between 10 and 19 
years. The UN describes the age group between 15 and 24 
as “youth” and uses the term “young people” for persons 
aged between 10 and 24 years. In addition to these rigid age 
brackets, which are irrelevant to the lives of most young 
people, there are also functional and cultural definitions of 
youth. Functional definitions proceed from the assumption 
that youth refers to the age at which childhood gradually 
gives way to adulthood, which is characterized by certain 
rituals and physiological changes. Cultural definitions 
focus more strongly on social contexts and on the roles as-
cribed to or adopted by individuals within a society. Thus 
“youth”, in the various societies, is more a social construct 
than a rigidly defined age bracket. Accordingly, there are 
many places where youth does not denote a specific age 
group so much as a specific status and specific types of 
conduct. The World Youth Report (2005, 150) offers the 
following general definition: “Youth represents the transi-
tion from childhood to adulthood and is therefore a dy-
namic stage in an individual’s development. It is an 
important period of physical, mental and social matu-
ration, during which young people are actively forming 
their identities and determining acceptable roles for them-
selves within their communities and societies. They are in-
creasingly capable of abstract thought and independent 
decision making. As their bodies continue to change, their 
sexuality begins to emerge, and they are presented with 
new physical and emotional feelings as well as new social 
expectations and challenges.”
There are currently about 140 million young people living 
in Latin America and the Caribbean. In some countries, 
young people under 24 years of age account for up to 60 
percent of the population. While Latin America, unlike 
many African countries, has already reached its demo-
graphic peak, the proportion of young people in the popu-
lation will remain at a high level in the coming years 
(World Youth Report 2007). Demographic pressure and the 
concomitant socio-economic problems are one reason for 
the critical situation in which many young people find 
IJCV : Vol. 5 (1) 2011, pp. 87 – 154
Imbusch, Misse, and Carrión: Violence Research in Latin America and the Caribbean 129
themselves in Latin America and the Caribbean (UNDP 
2006). The phenomena that make up a youth crisis include 
extreme social differences in young people’s prospects. 
These differences are expressed in the different educational 
levels of different social strata or milieus, unequal em-
ployment prospects, higher unemployment and high 
underemployment, gender and ethnic discrimination, and 
high migration figures. The UNDP has therefore correctly 
noted that the causes of the youth crisis are largely ex-
ogenous to youth. They have a lot to do with the shrinking 
of economic, social, and political prospects that young 
people are confronted with. To a large extent, youth crisis is 
to be understood as a crisis of the transition from youth to 
adulthood. Young people have fewer education and em-
ployment opportunities, and thus decreasing chances of es-
tablishing themselves as adults in an increasingly 
competitive world. Because they are excluded from deci-
sion-making, they may see the mainstream political chan-
nels as irrelevant. Their responses to this situation can be 
violent or non-violent, but their concrete actions often re-
flect a lack of status, and they are taken in an attempt to 
renegotiate the passage from youth to adulthood. For 
UNDP, the problem for Latin American societies is to in-
crease both the concrete opportunities available to young 
people and their sense of inclusion in society (UNDP 2006; 
Berkman 2007; CEPAL 2008; CEPAL, AECID, SEGIB and 
OIJ 2008). The issue of youth violence has therefore pre-
occupied a number of major international conferences 
since the 1990s (see Appendix).
What are the main structural factors behind the growth of 
youth violence? It is easy to argue that inequality and im-
poverishment, further reinforced by the neoliberal macro-
economic policies adopted by many countries throughout 
the region, together with the incapacity of the national 
states to address poverty and exclusion in the distribution 
of economic, political and social resources, account for the 
main reasons for the proliferation of juvenile delinquency 
and violence.
The economic crises experienced by several countries in 
the region together with the implementation of reckless 
macroeconomic adjustment policies have seriously 
weakened the capacity of the state to invest in basic services 
such as education and health, thus further eroding an al-
ready weak and fragmented welfare state. The vulnerability 
of youth to poverty and marginalization is well illustrated 
by the number of adolescents working to supplement the 
family income. In the large urban centers of Latin America, 
many children work in the most hazardous sectors such as 
prostitution and drug trafficking. Particularly those young 
people living in low-income families and deprived neigh-
borhoods experience trauma and stress related to poor and 
overcrowded living conditions, domestic violence, lack of 
quality education, exclusion from the labor market, lack of 
recreation areas and facilities, police violence, and various 
forms of discrimination. Relative deprivation and other 
complex social and economic problems tend to be concen-
trated at the bottom of the social pyramid, leading to large 
numbers of crimes committed by poor and marginalized 
people mainly against equally impoverished individuals. 
Under these conditions and circumstances it is no surprise 
that a number of youth involve themselves in gangs, crimi-
nal activities, and delinquency.
The social situation of young people in Latin America is 
characterized by a considerable crisis situation that might 
at least partly explain the rise in youth violence in the re-
gion. First of all, there is widespread poverty and in-
equality between the young people. Although violence 
does not originate in poverty per se – which would mean 
that the poorest countries like Haiti, Bolivia, and Peru or 
the Brazilian north-east should have the highest rates of 
violence and crime, whereas crime rates and violence are 
actually high in the large cities – it is impoverishment 
and inequality in combination with feelings of injustice 
that lead to violent conflict. The increase in violent crime 
in the region is strictly linked with the urbanization of 
poverty and with the increase of inequality and social po-
larization due to neoliberal politics and structural market 
reforms. Secondly, education is generally considered to 
provide low-income youths with better opportunities 
and life chances. But access to quality education in Latin 
America still seems to be the privilege of the more weal-
thy classes and completion rates remain insufficient to 
ensure a skilled labor force for competitive markets. High 
drop-out rates and poor educational attainment gener -
ally translate into higher probabilities to suffer marginal-
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ization. Third and consequently, youth un em ploy ment in 
the region has risen to unprecedented levels. Years of 
high population growth combined with inadequate edu-
cation have produced a glut of unskilled labor without 
chances on the labor markets. Unemployed youth repre-
sent about 50 percent of the total number of unemployed 
in the region. It is very likely that youth violence emerges 
not only out of their youthful wildness, but especially in 
response to socio-economic situations that function to 
their detriment. Besides poverty, inequality, and lack of 
education, and the frustrations deriving from such con-
ditions, there are other factors on the individual, house-
hold, community, and societal level which contribute to 
an increase in youth violence. Other structural deter-
minants of youth crime can be seen in the availability 
and proliferation of firearms, the expansion of drug mar-
kets, and the absence of the state, in terms of the inability 
of the state to enforce the law, to secure the legal mon-
opoly of violence, to combat corruption, and to protect 
the citizens, especially the lower classes, from abuses of 
power (CEPAL 2008).
Altogether, the consequences of economic and social prob-
lems and a lack of human security can be identified as root 
causes of youth crime in the region. From these structural, 
mainly economic and social reasons, we can conclude that 
adolescents and young adults in any Latin American so-
ciety face a number of challenges related to their age and 
this particular transitional period of their life. Adolescents 
who must deal with the consequences of social dis-
integration and economic exclusion may find it difficult to 
legally earn an income while at the same time being con-
fronted with huge expectations on the part of parents, peer 
groups, and society or simply with the phenomenon of 
“easy money”. The highly complex and multifaceted prob-
lem of youth violence can thus be summed up as a violent 
reaction to an unequal und unjust society that offers few 
opportunities for disadvantaged youths to break out of the 
vicious circle of poverty and exclusion. It is no surprise 
that under such circumstances young males between the 
ages of 15 to 25 are generally the most violent group in 
Latin America and at the same time suffer from the highest 
homicide rates and experiences with violence in the region 
(Waiselfisz 2008).
While CEPAL, AECID, SEGIB and OIJ (2008) present 
comparative figures for youth homicide rates in the 1980s 
and at the beginning of the new millennium in order to 
document the steep rise in youth violence, the evaluation 
of youth violence in Latin America by Waiselfisz (2008) 
not only provides a comparative compilation of the most 
recent data on violence (murder, suicide, death by fire-
arms, death in traffic accidents), but also shows that in the 
countries most severely affected by violence murder is by 
far the most frequent cause of death for young men. An-
other commendable aspect of this study is that Waiselfisz 
includes not only homicide rates, but also the figures for 
suicides; these figures show that the youth suicide rate, 
too, is far above the global average in almost all the coun-
tries of the subcontinent (with the exception of Cuba and 
Uruguay).
In recent decades, the single most dominant theme in the 
context of youth violence has been that of youth gangs. 
Throughout the 1990s, there was exponential growth of 
youth gangs in Latin America. In different countries and 
areas they are called maras (in El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Honduras), bandas (in Colombia and Ecuador), chimbas, 
manchas (in Peru), pandillas (in Mexico and Nicaragua), 
barras (in Argentina), parchas, chapulines (in Costa Rica), 
quadrilhas or galeras cariocas (in Brazil). Youth gangs exist 
to differing extents in nearly all Latin American countries. 
While it is difficult to estimate the concrete proportion of 
violence and crime caused by these youth gangs, there can 
be no doubt that they have become an ubiquitious force in 
many urban barrios and that they are major contributors 
to the high levels of crime.
According to Rodgers (1999) youth gangs exist in Ar-
gentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru, Jamaica, and Puerto 
Rico. Although empirical studies are lacking, the presence 
of youth gangs has also been reported in Belize, Honduras, 
Panama, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Ecuador. In Nicaragua 
there are some 110 pandillas in Managua alone, with ap-
proximately 8,500 members. In Mexico City and Guayaquil 
there are approximately 1,500 bandas. In Chile, subcultures 
with different attitudes and normative beliefs have been 
identified in urban and rural groups of criminal youth. In 
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Medellín, there are some 200 youth gangs with very young 
affiliates. In Rio de Janeiro there are some 6,000 children 
and adolescents between the ages of 10 and 18 involved in 
drug gangs that control most of the favelas (Benvenuti 
2003). The phenomenon of youth gangs has assumed most 
dramatic proportions in Central America, particularly in El 
Salvador, where in recent years the number of members of 
maras and the level of criminal violence have skyrocketed. 
The two major gangs – “Mara Salvatrucha” (MS) and “Los 
de la 18” (the 18th Street Gang) – are known for their ex-
treme violence, well-structured organization, possession of 
many lethal weapons, and heavy consumption of alcohol 
and narcotics. Youth gangs in Latin America are overwhel-
mingly an urban phenomenon.
A recent report on gang violence by USAID (2006) points 
to some common root causes of gang activities: marginal-
ized urban areas with minimal access to basic services, high 
levels of youth unemployment compounded by insufficient 
access to educational opportunities, chronically high levels 
of social and economic inequality, overwhelmed and inef-
fective justice systems, the rise of drug markets, easy access 
to arms and an illicit economy, dysfunctional families, and 
high levels of intra-familial violence.
Nevertheless, the “world of gangs”, and their formation, 
structure, and behavior are often popularly defined in 
terms of stereotypes that typically include the idea that 
gangs are composed of late-adolescent males who are vi-
olent and fuelled by drugs and alcohol; sexually hyper-
active, reckless, cold-blooded, drug-dealing criminals who 
strive for profit and domination within the inner city 
neighborhoods (Benvenuti 2003). But many studies cor-
rectly depict violence and gang membership in Latin 
America as a more complex social issue. Mostly, the devel-
opment of gangs is the result of multiple marginalities 
(Virgil 1998), meaning manifold exclusions from main-
stream society. Out of these dynamics, a specific inner city 
culture – “una cultura callejera” – has emerged that seeks 
to fill the vacuum left by the lack of education, non- or 
underemployment, and lack of normal social bonds or so-
cial integration. Therefore, many studies on gangs in 
Latin America put the greatest emphasis not on their 
criminal activities but on their socio-cultural aspects, thus 
downplaying a bit the harm gangs cause to local commu-
nities. They remember Frederic Trasher’s classic pro-
position from 1927 that a gang “is an interstitial group, 
originally formed spontaneously, and then integrated 
through conflict.” Trasher characterized gangs by the fol-
lowing types of behavior: “meeting face to face, milling, 
movement through space as a unit, conflict, and planning. 
The result of this collective behavior is the development 
of tradition, unreflective internal structure, esprit de 
corps, solidarity, morale, group awareness, and attach-
ment to a local territory” (Trasher 1927). The most wides-
pread criteria considered to set youth gangs apart from 
other juvenile peer groups is their routine association 
with illegal and violent activities. Therefore it is mislead-
ing to label youth gangs as violent and criminal by nature. 
The conception of youth gangs as inherently violent is of 
course the result of a widespread criminalizing process 
(Jones and Rodgers 2009).
If we take a closer look at the socio-cultural aspects of the 
gangs in Latin America, numerous studies underscore the 
interplay of gangs and youth violence with other forms of 
social behavior and the formation of identities (Jones and 
Rodgers 2009; Strocka 2008). Because youth gang 
members are predominantly male, many scholars tie them 
to machismo and specific conceptualizations of masculin-
ity. Masculine identities are manifest in male-on-male as 
well as in male-on-female violence. Gangs have also in-
troduced new acts of violence which may function as rites 
of passage for the new gang members, for example “beat-
ing-in” for male and rape for female gang members. 
Gangs often establish distinctive, characteristic identifiers 
such as tattoos and their iconography, body piercings, 
graffiti tags, colors, hand-signals, clothing and hair styles, 
jewelry, hip-hop lyrics, and special signs like secret greet-
ings, slurs, or code words and other group-specific sym-
bols associated with the gang’s common beliefs, rituals, 
and mythologies to define and differentiate themselves 
from rival groups or gangs. The use of these symbols is 
also associated with macho performances, extending cul-
tural mores, and adding explicit sexualized and violent 
overtones. Furthermore, they communicate specific in-
formational cues to threaten, disparage, taunt, harass, and 
intimidate other groups or the public, thereby establish-
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ing clear territories of control and rivalries among dif-
ferent gangs.
At the same time, membership in a gang is a kind of “sur-
rogate family” and constitutes a form of negative inte-
gration. Gang membership represents a kind of inclusion 
in a situation of exclusion, since belonging to a stigmatized 
group allows for collective identification while also bring-
ing recognition and guaranteeing an identity that cannot 
be attained by other means. At the micro level, many gangs 
form a system of social integration that goes some way to-
wards compensating for social disintegration at the macro 
level, even as it reinforces this disintegration. In this way, 
youth gangs form an alternative space for processes of so-
cialization for excluded and marginalized children and 
adolescents whose sense of belonging is rooted in ritualized 
recognition and collective activities which range from 
shared recreational activities all the way to the perpetration 
of criminal and violent acts. Thus the gang offers a possi-
bility of social participation and provides a system of valu-
es that gives rise to personal and group identities by means 
of new communication codes and relationships of auth-
ority. Gang members often report the need for identity, 
solidarity, social networks, security, and protection. Ob-
viously, gangs often serve as a partial replacement for cru-
cial lacking social institutions, such as families, schools, 
and labor markets.
In general, gangs represent an attempt by young people to 
reconstruct their identities, and to rebel against institutions 
(for example family, school, or even the labor market) that 
are characterized by chronic inequality and exclusion. This 
is what Hagedorn (2008) calls “resistance identities”. They 
constitute violent means of rebellion, a way of condemning 
the lack of opportunities available to them and the state’s 
failure to properly address their needs. As such, they pre-
sent alternative sources of income, and a means of recon-
structing a sense of security, belonging, recognition, and 
participation that society seems to deny them in a cat-
egorical manner.
Earlier in this review, much has been written about the dif-
ferent strategies to contain violence effectively. Policy dis-
cussions over crime and violence are often framed 
politically and ideologically. There are many different ideas 
and programs to combat violence, ranging from extreme 
repressive strategies such as “mano dura” or “super mano 
dura” to more conciliatory strategies like community po-
licing (Aguilar Villamariona 2006a). Successful strategies 
depend on the type and extent of violence as well as the so-
cietal context in which it takes place. However, it is by no 
means easy to achieve the right balance in terms of pre-
venting crime, meeting the needs of the victims, protecting 
society, and dealing with young offenders. But it should be 
emphasized that much juvenile crime is transitory, pre-
vention should be highlighted instead of pure repression, 
and formal intervention should be minimized as much as 
possible while at the same time respecting the rights of the 
victims and the needs of the children and young people 
and their families. This might be a way to effectively deal 
with violent crime and juvenile offenders without produc-
ing the counter-productive side-effects of traditional me-
thods of violence control.
At the moment, we see a lot of campaigns for harsh re-
pressive measures against certain delinquent groups and 
“wars against crime” that find some support among local 
populations. But if we take a closer look at the perceived 
youth violence problems of Latin American governments 
(CEPAL, AECID, SEGIB and OIJ 2008), there is not only a 
considerable range of most important problems as-
sociated with young people but also a multitude of pro-
grams existing from different government authorities to 
deal with the social problems of young people (CEPAL 
2008). Despite the undeniable will to come to terms with 
the problem of youth violence, there remains a consider-
able gap between official pronouncements and actual con-
crete action.
4. Conclusions
Violence is an endemic aspect of everyday life in Latin 
America. Scientific literature and data on the different 
forms of violence at different historical times are abundant. 
On closer examination, however, it is evident that the 
scientific output varies greatly between different regions 
and countries. In some countries, there is a broad debate 
about violence and the issue is studied by several research 
facilities (universities or other scientific institutions), while 
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violence research is institutionally underdeveloped in other 
countries. To date, there is no country in Latin America 
where conflict and violence research represents an aca-
demic discipline in its own right. Similarly, there is no sign 
of regular higher education courses that aim to develop 
competence in conflict management or violence counsel-
ing. Literature production comes from Latin American as 
well as international scholars, but important aspects of vi-
olence are still neglegted and there are many open ques-
tions for further research.
First of all, we need a more detailed understanding of the 
reasons and causes for the extent of violence in Latin 
America. The factors proposed to date include structural, 
societal, or personal background, peculiarities of Latin 
American history or the history of single countries, high 
rates of economic and social inequality and forms of social 
disintegration, truncated modernization processes, and 
race, class, and poverty.
Second, we need to know more about the reasons for the 
important differences between the Latin American nations 
and their levels of violence as well as for the similarities of 
violent developments during certain periods. With regard 
to this aspect, the Latin American subcontinent is diverging 
into different regions and sub-regions that should be con-
sidered separately to reach more valid conclusions in a 
comparative perspective.
Third, most of the literature on violence in Latin America is 
descriptive in scope thus providing many valuable insights 
into the development of violence. But what is at stake is a 
more analytical understanding of violence, a theory of viol-
ence – if possible – or explanatory models to address more 
systematically the different forms and aspects of violence.
Fourth, methodologies for fruitful violence research and 
databases on violence are weak. This is a problem for viol-
ence research all over the world, but the situation is slightly 
more dramatic in Latin America where an adequate infra-
structure for empirical research is often lacking, where vi-
olence research itself is sometimes dangerous or simply 
impossible due to adverse circumstances. Methodologi-
cally, there are different approaches to violence research 
(quantitative and qualitative, with many sub-groups). Re-
liable data on violence in different countries are rare due to 
a lack of statistics, inaccuracies in police data, or for politi-
cal reasons. There is an urgent need to improve the knowl-
edge base on violence in different countries to get more 
reliable and comparative data of a longitudinal or cross-
sectional type.
Even for the recent rise in crime and violence in Latin 
America, the available evidence is not conclusive. Exist-
ing sources of reported crime and violence data are often 
contradictory, methods of violence research are neither 
compatible nor reconcilable, and statistics and data sets 
are unreliable. Nothing would be more misleading than 
unqualified overgeneralizations. If any pattern is clear, it 
is that crime and violence are highly variable across 
countries and even across localities within countries. 
Nevertheless, the evidence is clear that violence in Latin 
America is a serious problem that has a significant im-
pact on the health, well-being, economic development, 
and security of the region. Violence and insecurity are 
likely to erode democratic attitudes in several Latin 
American and Caribbean countries. Particularly coun-
tries where processes of institutional consolidation and 
democratization are still evolving, the effects of violence 
and insecurity on political processes and democracy are 
a heavy burden. They matter for democracy in the region 
as well as for perceptions about the performance of gov-
ernments on public security issues. The way people per-
ceive the commitment of their governments in tackling 
public insecurity and crime is important for democratic 
legitimacy.
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Appendix: Links, Internet Sources, Data
1. National Statistics Offices
Mexico and Central America:
• Mexico: INEGI www.inegi.org.mx
• Nicaragua: INEC, INIDE www.inec.gob.ni
• El Salvador: DIGESTYC www.digestyc.gob.sv
• Honduras: INE www.ine-hn.org
• Guatemala: INE www.ine.gob.gt
• Costa Rica: INEC www.inec.go.cr
• Panama: ENDEP www.contraloria.gob.pa/dec/Ende.aspx
Caribbean Region:
• Dominican Republic: ONE www.one.gob.do
• Jamaica: Statistical Institute of Jamaica www.statinja.com
• Cuba: ONE www.one.cu
Andean Region:
• Colombia: DANE www.dane.gov.co
• Venezuela: INE www.ine.gov.ve
• Ecuador: INEC www.inec.gov.ec
• Bolivia: INE www.ine.gov.bo
• Peru: INEI www.inei.gob.pe
Brazil:
• IBGE www.ibge.gov.br
• Ministério da Saúde http://tabnet.datasus.gov.br/cgi/
idb2004/matriz.htm
Cono Sur:
• Argentina: INDEC www.indec.mecon.ar
• Chile: INE www.ine.cl
• Uruguay: INE www.ine.gub.uy
• Paraguay: Dirección General de Estadisticas, Encuestas y 
Censos www.dgeec.gov.py
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2. Leading Scholars on Violence in Latin America and the Caribbean
Mexico
Astorga, Luis (UNAM-IIS, México D.F.)
Azaola Garrido, Elena (CIESAS)
Fuentes Romero, David (Instituto de Investigaciones Sociales, U de Baja 
California)
Herrera, Cristina (FLACSO, México D.F.)
Jiménez, René (UNAM-IIS, México D.F.)
Caribbean
Harriot, Anthony (University of the West Indies at Mona, Jamaica)
Rapley, John (CaPRI, University of the West Indies)
Venezuela
Briceño-León, Roberto (Universidad Central de Venezuela, LACSO, Caracas)
Hernández, Tosca (Instituto de Ciencias Penales y Criminológicas, Universi-
dad Central de Venezuela)
Sanjuán, Ana María (Centro para la Paz, Universidad Central de Venezuela)
Zubillaga, Verónica (LACSO, Caracas)
Brazil
Abramovay, Miriam (RITLA, Brasilia)
Adorno, Sérgio (NEV-USP, São Paulo)
Cardia, Nancy (NEV-USP, São Paulo)
Miraglia, Paula (ILANUD, São Paulo)
Misse, Michel (NECVU, IFCS/UFRJ, Rio de Janeiro)
Ratton, José Luis (Center for the Study and Research of Crime, Violence and 
Politics at the UFPE – Universidade Federal de Pernambuco)
Rizzini, Irene (CIESPI, Rio de Janeiro)
Zaluar, Alba (Universidade do Estado de Rio Janeiro)
United States
Bailey, John (University of Michigan)
Biehl, María Loreto (IDB, Washington D.C.)
Buvinic, Mayra (World Bank, Washington D.C.)
Concha-Eastman, Alberto (PAHO/WHO, Washington D.C.)
Fajnzylber, Pablo (World Bank, Washington D.C.)
Morrison, Andrew (IDB, Washington D.C.)
Pinheiro, Paulo Sérgio (OAS, Washington D.C.)
Sommers, Marc (USAID, Washington D.C.)
Central America
Carranza, Marlon E. (UCA, San Salvador)
Castellanos, Julieta (Universidad Nacional Autónoma de Honduras) 
Cruz, José Miguel (UCA, San Salvador)
Rocha, José Luis (UCA, Managua)
Sandoval García, Carlos (Universidad de Costa Rica)
Vul Galperín, Mónica (Universidad de Costa Rica)
Colombia
Orozco, Iván (Universidad de los Andes, Bogotá)
Palacios, Marco (Universidad Nacional de Colombia, Bogotá)
Perea Restrepo, Carlos Mario (Universidad Nacional de Colombia, Bogotá)
Pizarro, Eduardo (IEPRI, Universidad Nacional de Colombia, Bogotá)
Romero, Mauricio (Universidad Javeriana, Bogotá)
Sánchez Gómez, Gonzalo (Universidad Nacional de Colombia, Bogotá)
Uribe, María Vitoria (Universida Javeriana, Bogotá)
Andean countries
Andrade, Xavier (FLACSO, Quito) 
Basombrío, Carlos (Instituto de Defensa Legal, Lima)
Carrión, Fernando (FLACSO, Quito)
Costa, Gino (Fundación Ciudad Nuestra, Lima)
Degregori, Carlos Iván (IEP, Lima)
Morales Cordova, Hugo (Universidad de Lima)
Pajuelo, Ramón (IEP, Lima)
Panfichi, Aldo ( Pontífica Universidad Católica del Perú)
Cono Sur
Dammert, Lucia (Consorcio Global por la Transformación de la Seguridad, Santiago)
Frühling, Hugo (CESC, Santiago)
Isla, Alejandro (FLACSO, Buenos Aires)
Kessler, Gabriel (Universidad Nacional de General Sarmiento/CONICET, Buenos Aires)
Míguez, Daniel (CONICET, Buenos Aires)
Pegoraro, Juan (Universidad de Buenos Aires)
Petrissans Aguilar, Ricardo (ILACON, Montevideo)
Rodríguez, Ernesto (CELAJU, Montevideo)
Sozzo, Máximo (Universidad Nacional del Litoral, Santa Fe)
Tiscornia, Sofía (Universidad de Buenos Aires)
Vanderschueren, Franz (Universidad Jesuita A. Hurtado, Santiago)
Viscardi, Nilia (Universidad de la República, Montevideo)
Europe
Hume, Mo (University of Liverpool)
Jones, Gareth (LSE, London)
Kay, Cristóbal (IIS, The Hague)
Krug, Etienne (WHO, Geneva)
Kruijt, Dirk (Utrecht University)
McIlwaine, Cathy (Queen Mary, University of London)
Moser, Caroline (ODI, London)
Pécaut, Daniel (EHESS, Paris)
Rodgers, Dennis (LSE, London)
Waldmann, Peter (University of Augsburg)
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3. International Organizations and Research Institutions Relevant for the 
Study of Violence in Latin America and the Caribbean 
Center for Disease Control, Atlanta  
www.cdc.gov
Center for Research on Inequality, Human Security and 
Ethnicity, Oxford  
www.crise.ox.ac.uk
Centroamerica joven, FLACSO El Salvador  
www.centroamericajoven.org
Comisión Económica para América Latina (CEPAL)  
www.eclac.org
Consejo Latinoamericano de Ciencias Sociales (CLACSO)  
www.clacso.org.ar
Crisis States Research Center, LSE, London  
www.crisisstates.com
Faculdad Latinoamericano de Ciencias Sociales (FLACSO)  
www.flacso.org
Hispanic American Center for Economic Research, 
 Washington D.C. 
www.hacer.org
Institute for Interdisciplinary Research on Conflict and 
 Violence, Bielefeld  
www.uni-bielefeld.de/(en)/ikg/index.htm
Instituto Latinoamericano de las Naciones Unidas para la 
Prevención del Delito y el Tratamiento del Delincuente 
 (ILANUD)  
www.ilanud.or.cr/
Inter-American Development Bank  
www.iadb.org
Interdisciplinary Latin America Center, Bonn  
www.ilz.uni-bonn.de/links_es.html
International Crime Victim Survey (ICVS)  
United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research 
Institute (UNCRI)  
www.unicri.it/wwd/analysis/icvs/data.php
International Women’s Tribune Center  
www.iwtc.org
Internet Resources for Latin America  
http://lib.nmsu.edu/subject/bord/laguia/
Laboratorio de Ciencias Sociales (LACSO), Caracas  
www.lacso.org.ve
Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP)  
http://sitemason.vanderbilt.edu/lapop
Latin American Network Information Center  
http://lanic.utexas.edu/la/region/las-org/
Latin American Studies Organization  
http://lasa.international.pitt.edu/links.html
Latinobarómetro  
www.latinobarometro.org
Nucleo de Estudos da Violência – Universidad de São Paulo  
www.nevusp.org/mapas/
Online Encyclopedia of Mass Violence  
www.massviolence.org
Pan American Health Organization  
www.paho.org
Peace Research Center, Madrid  
www.cipresearch.fuhem.es
Madre – Demanding Rights, Resources and Results for 
Women Worldwide  
www.madre.org
Sexual Violence Research Initiative  
www.svri.org/
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Stop Violence against Women (SVAW), Advocates for 
Human Rights 
www.stopvaw.org
United Nations Development Program  
www.undp.org
United Nations Office on Crime and Drugs  
www.unodc.org/unodc/en/crime_cicp_research.html
Washington Office on Latin America 
www.wola.org
United Nations Surveys of Crime Trends and Operations of 
Criminal Justice Systems  
www.uncjin.org/stats/wcs.html
Woodrow Wilson Center  
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=topics.
home&topic_id=1425
World Health Organization  
www.who.int/violence-injury-prevention/violence/en/
World Bank  
www.worldbank.org
Youth Portal for Latin America and the Caribbean  
www.youthlac.org
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4. Conferences on Youth and Violence in Latin America (2000-2010)
Crime and Violence: Causes and Policy Responses  
Universidad de los Andes / World Bank, May 4–5, 2000, 
Bogotá
Simposio 2001: Violencia de Género, Salud y Derechos en las 
Américas  
June 4–5, 2001, Cancún, México
Youth Violence in Latin America: Gangs, Street Violence, and 
Juvenile Justice in Perspective  
LSE, May 26–27, 2005, London
Coloquio: Violencias, Culturas Institucionales y Sociabilidad  
FLACSO, November 8–10, 2006, Buenos Aires
Seminário: Violência Urbana  
CEBRAP / ILANUD, December 4, 2006, São Paulo
Primera Jornada de Investigaciones en Violencia y Justicia  
IDES, December 7, 2006, Buenos Aires
Security Sector Reform in Latin America: Impact of Irregular 
Threats  
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Sept-
ember 10, 2007, Washington D.C.
Crime, Violence, and Security in the CARICOM: Creating 
Community in the Caribbean  
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Oc-
tober 30, 2007, Washington D.C.
Colloquium: The Role of the Police in Crime Prevention  
ICPC’s Seventh Annual Crime Prevention Colloquium, 
November 8–9, 2007, Oslo
In War as in Peace: Youth Violence – A Challenge for Inter-
national Cooperation  
Evangelische Akademie Loccum, November 14–16, 2007, 
Rehburg-Loccum
New Directions for the Study of Citizen Security in Latin 
America  
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Janu-
ary 28, 2008, Washington D.C.
The Politics of Violence in Latin America  
Public Symposium, ConocoPhillips Theater, Glenbow Mu-
seum, Calgary, April 24, 2008
Seminario: Prevención de las Conductas de Riesgo entre la 
Juventud  
XVIII Cumbre Iberoamericana, October 15–16, 2008, 
México D.F.
Congreso Internacional sobre Paz, Violencia y Desarrollo  
niversidad Autónoma del Estado de México, February 20, 
2009, México
Representations of Violence in Latin America  
Lozano Long Institute of Latin American Studies, March 
6–7, 2009, University of Texas, Austin
Violent Crime and Democratization in the Global South  
March 18–19, 2009, Cape Town, South Africa
Gewalt im Frieden: Formen, Ursachen, Einhegungsmöglich-
keiten der Gewaltkriminalität in Zentralamerika  
Institut für Politikwissenschaft, Universität Leipzig, March 
25–28, 2009, Leipzig
III Encontro Anual: Fórum Brasileiro de Segurança Pública  
April 1–3, 2009, Vitória
Violence Prevention – A Critical Dimension of Development  
The World Bank, April 6–7, 2009, Washington D.C.
Workshop: The Politics of Violence in Latin America  
The Armed Groups Project, May 15–17, 2009, Banff 
Centre, Banff, Canada
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Peter Imbusch  
pimbusch@uni-wuppertal.de
Michel Misse  
misse@ifcs.ufrj.br
Fernando Carrión  
fcarrion@flacso.org.ec
The Prevention of Youth Violence in Latin America: Lessons 
Learned and Future Challenges  
Woodrow Wilson Center (co-sponsored with the Inter-
American Coalition for the Prevention of Violence), 
 October 27, 2009, Washington D.C.
